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 ABSTRACT 
                  
State Capacity and Naval Buildup: The Sino-Japanese Divergence in the 
Late Nineteenth Century 
  
by 
                    
SHEN Xinyi 
                                 
Master of Philosophy 
                                      
The East Asian modernization divergence in the late nineteenth century has long 
puzzled historians and social scientists. As Qing China, given its vast territory, large 
population and dominating influence spreading to neighboring countries, failed to 
modernize herself as its small island neighbor Japan did after the forced opening up 
by the West. One important divergence is their military capability, especially that of 
navy. The relatively higher capacity of the Imperial Japanese Navy has played a 
decisive role in its victory over the Beiyang Fleet in the 1894/95 First Sino-Japanese 
War. Following the defeat, Qing China was burdened with huge indemnity, 
eventually collapsed and entered long decades of chaos, whereas Meiji Japan 
continued rapid modernization, further demonstrated its military power in war with 
Russia, and became the only recognized power in Asia.  
 
Explaining the Sino-Japanese divergence in naval buildup is the first step to tackle 
the entire modernization puzzle. Having challenged two conventional explanations of 
national security decision-making and economic modernization, this thesis offers a 
new perspective by arguing that the root of divergence lies in their different resource 
mobilization capacity. Specifically, I demonstrate that the elastic tax revenue, fiscal 
centralization and enormous borrowing capacity equipped Meiji Japan as a strong 
state able to quickly mobilize a vast sum of resource for expensive naval buildup and 
 war. In contrast, in Qing China, the growingly decentralized fiscal system, together 
with the stagnated tax revenue and limited borrowing capacity, made resource 
mobilization a prolonged struggle for the central government. Consequently, despite 
the statesmen’s repetitive emphasis of naval security and buildup, the Chinese state’s 
weak resource mobilization capacity has significantly hindered its pursuit of naval 
power and gradually widened the gap with the stronger Japanese state.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
 
On 25th July 1894, the Imperial Japanese Navy sank the Chinese naval transporting 
ship Gao Sheng without warning and kicked the start of the First Sino-Japanese War. 
The war was a culmination of the rivalries between the two countries for decades and 
was watched with great interest by the Western powers as a test of the relative 
success of the two’s modernization programs. To the surprise of many observers, 
who without much doubt predicted the historically powerful China to be the winner, 
Qing China’s Beiyang Fleet was heavily beaten and almost destroyed by the Imperial 
Japanese Navy. By April 1895, the Qing government was forced to sue for peace 
under humiliating terms.1 
 
Indeed, the war result is very puzzling considering that the Great Qing Empire, with 
its vast territory, large population and dominating influence spreading to neighboring 
countries, had been historically superior for centuries. The outcome of the war, 
according to many military historians, was significantly affected by the two countries’ 
divergent naval capabilities rather than factors such as tactics and command. While 
Qing China’s Beiyang Fleet had a narrow advantage in the total displacement of 
warships, the Imperial Japanese Navy was overwhelmingly superior in speed and 
armament that were eventually translated into decisive advantage in the battlefield.2  
 
How come the newly-formed Meiji state was able to build up a greater-capability  
navy than the traditionally more powerful Qing China? Existing literature, despite its  
                                                      
1 Allen Fung, “Testing the Self-strengthening: the Chinese Army in the Sino-Japanese War of 
1894-1895,” Modern Asian Studies 30, no. 4 (1996): 1008. 
2 Benjamin A. Elman, “Naval Warfare and the Refraction of China’s Self-Strengthening Reforms into 
Scientific and Technological Failure, 1865-1895,” Modern Asian Studies 38, no. 2 (2004): 318-319. 
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substantive amount, has yet to provide a rigorous explanation. Conventional 
explanations such as national security decision-making and economic modernization 
have been proved insufficient or inaccurate. In this case, studies of the formation of 
the so-called “fiscal-military state” are inspiring in offering insights of how some 
European states managed to stand out in the intensive intra-state conflicts by 
enhancing their capacity to pay for wars.3 With the rapid technology advancement, 
navy became much larger, more complex in structure, more permanent and thus 
required more money to be maintained. And it follows logically that only a state able 
to raise unprecedented sums of money could catch up with these developments and 
become a naval power. Among all European states, it was Britain that mastered the 
most effective resource mobilizing tools that achieved extraordinary success in the 
repetitive conflicts and consolidated its position as a global naval hegemony.4 In 
contrast, traditional continental power such as France, which ought to have come off 
best in view of its size and natural resources, was left behind due to lack of effective 
means to mobilize resources.  
 
So what account for a state’s capacity of effective resource mobilization for fighting 
expensive wars? Traditional indicators such as the size of economy and bureaucratic 
capacity fail to indicate how much resource states could mobilize. To offer a better 
account, this thesis provides a three-dimensional measurement of state’s resource 
mobilization capacity and illustrates how it affected the Sino-Japanese naval buildup. 
Specifically, I argue that a strong state capable of effective resource mobilization 
usually fulfill three conditions: 1. Taxing capacity; 2. Fiscal centralization; 3. 
                                                      
3 John Brewer. The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783. (London: Unwin 
Hyman, 1989), 101. 
4 Patrick K. O’Brien, “The Political Economy of British Taxation, 1660-1815,” The Economic 
History Review 41, no. 1 (1988): 26-27. 
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Borrowing capacity. For Meiji Japan, it gradually evolved as a strong state through 
the tax reforms, fiscal centralization and heavy domestic borrowing. Firstly, tax 
revenues, especially of indirect taxes increased rapidly through centralized and 
efficient assessment and collection. Meanwhile, fiscal centralization was achieved by 
establishing a central treasury to directly manage majority of state revenue. Lastly, 
the punctual interest payment and establishment of a central bank enabled the 
government to borrow heavily from domestic market, which supported naval 
expansion when tax revenues were inadequate. By contrast, Qing China remained a 
relatively weak state with the constraints from fiscal decentralization, stagnated 
taxing capacity and limited borrowing capacity. After the Taiping Rebellion, the 
central government’s effective supervision and control over provincial resources 
declined. Since the center was not yet able to borrow extensively from domestic 
market, its naval buildup could only be funded by its limited tax revenues with no 
increase for two decades. Eventually, the limited resources forced Qing China to 
discontinue naval expansion at a crucial point of time. In sum, the Sino-Japanese 
divergence in resource mobilization capacity largely explained their varied naval 
policy-making and buildup results.  
 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: The second chapter critically 
examines two common explanations of the Sino-Japanese naval divergence. I argue 
that although there is some truth to both explanations, neither adequately explains the 
changes in the two countries’ naval expansion policies prior to the war. Next, I 
conceptualize state’s resource mobilization capacity and argue that it is a more useful 
variable to explain the divergence. In the following two chapters, I provide empirical 
analyses of Meiji Japan and Qing China’s resource mobilization capacities and argue 
that it was their different capacities that heavily influenced the formation and result 
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of naval expansion policies. The thesis concludes by a brief review of subsequent 
period and a discussion of theorical implications. 
 
Chapter 2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 What is to be explained?  
 
For decades, the Sino-Japanese naval divergence has received scholarly attentions 
due to its puzzling nature and historical significance. Since the mid nineteenth 
century, both Qing China and Meiji Japan came under increasing threat from the 
West. While both started to undertake naval buildup programs from scratch, within 
just two decades, Meiji Japan was able to surpass Qing China in building up a 
greater-capability navy. In addition to factors like tactics and command, it was naval 
capability that played a decisive role in determining the war result. As argued by 
many military historians, the Imperial Japanese Navy was superior in crucial aspects 
including speed, age of major warships, and armament, all of which have greatly 
contributed to its victory at sea (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Comparison of Capabilities, Imperial Japanese Navy and Beiyang Fleet, 1894 
 
Imperial Japanese Navy Capability Beiyang Fleet 
4 capital ships, 1 armored 
cruiser, 12 unprotected 
cruisers, 7 gunboats, 26 
torpedo boats 
 
Component of 
main force 
2 capital ships, 3 armored 
cruisers, 5 unprotected 
cruisers, 6 gunboats, 6 
torpedo boats 
 
The Matsushima-class 
 
 
None were over 3,000 tons 
displacement, which was 
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battleships (Akitsushima and 
Yoshino) were 4,150 tons 
displacement. 
Displacement smaller than the 1890s’ 
standard. However, the 
overall displacement of 
battleships were greater. 
All equipped with newly-
introduced 6in or 4.7in quick-
firers (QF) gun with a rate of 
fire of 10-12 rpm (round per 
minute).  
 
Average 13.52 mile/h 
 
 
 
Armament 
 
All equipped with 6in or 12in 
breech-loaders gun 
introduced in the 1870s, with 
a rate of fire of just 1 rpm. 
None was updated with the 
latest QF gun. 
Average 11.68 mile/h 
Five fast cruisers  
(Matsushima, Itsukushima, 
Hashidate, Yoshino, Chiyoda) 
 
Speed 
 
No fast cruisers. The speed of 
early-acquired ironclads was 
constrained by their less 
advanced engines. 
Average five years  
Age of  
main force  
 
Average seven to thirteen 
years 
 
Source: Qing China:?????????????????????????2009
???????????????-???????????????????2002
???Richard N. J. Wright. The Chinese Steam Navy, 1862-1945. London: Chatham 
Publishing, 2000. 
Meiji Japan: Schencking, J. Charles. Making Waves: Politics, Propaganda, and the 
Emergence of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1868-1922. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2005; Evans, David C., and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, 
Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941. Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press, 2012; ?? ????????????(????1995
?)? 
 
Table 2 further reveals how the divergence was formed and gradually widened year 
by year. It is clear that although Qing China started naval expansion earlier, Meiji 
 6 
Japan was able to catch up since the early 1880s by launching two continuous, 
multiyear expansion programs. While Meiji Japan carried on expanding till the eve 
of war, Qing China struggled in achieving the original goals it set, slowed down the 
progress and eventually called off the expansion several years in ahead of the war. 
The stagnation of naval buildup was fatal to China’s naval capability in an age of 
rapid technological advancement and significantly contributed to its incoming defeat. 
 
Table 2. Timeline of Naval Expansion, Meiji Japan and Qing China, 1870-1893 
 
Meiji Japan Qing China 
Early 
1870s 
The new Meiji government 
centralized naval forces from 
seaborne domains, and 
established the Ministry of Navy 
(??? Kaigun-???) in 1872.  
 
1870-73 Qing government founded Fujian 
and Jiangsu Navy, the first steam 
navies equipped with western 
firepower in China. 
1872-82 Purchased 3 small gunboats from 
Britain 
(the armored steel-hulled frigate
?? Fuso, the armored corvettes
?? Kongo, and?? Hiei) 
 
In 1882, the navy decided to 
discontinue the construction of 
wooden warships. The Yokosuka 
shipyard (???????) 
began to produce small quantities 
of Western steel warships after 
importing machinery and skilled 
workers from Britain.  
 
1874-77 1st long-term expansion program:  
The Qing court convened the First 
“Grand Discussion of Seaborne 
Defense (?????)”. They 
decided to construct Beiyang and 
Nanyang Fleets and assigned 4 
million tael of silver annually as 
ordinary naval maintenance fee.  
 
In 1875, purchased 4 gunboats from 
Britain. (??????????
?) 
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1883-85 1st long-term expansion 
program:  
Length: 8 years (1883-1891) 
Cost: Over 24 million yen in total 
Scale: 46 warships (22 torpedo 
boats and cruisers) 
 
Purchased 2 protected cruisers 
from Britain. (?? Naniwa and
??? Takachiho)  
 
1878-84 In 1878, purchased another 4 
gunboats from Britain (????
???????) and another 3 
next year (?????????) 
 
In 1881, purchased 2 ironclads, 2 
protected cruisers, 1 ram cruiser 
and 2 torpedo boats from Germany. 
They became the major forces in 
the First Sino-Japanese War. (2 
ironclads:?????; 2 protected 
crusiers: ?????; 1 armored 
cruiser:??) 
 
1886-92 Further additions to the 1882 
program: 
Extra 7 million yen for naval 
expansion by issuing naval bonds.  
 
Purchased 2 cruisers from France 
(?? Matsushima and??
Itsukushima) and construct 1 
cruiser (?? Hashidate at the 
Yokosuka shipyard), 3 coastal 
warships, 2 small cruisers, and 16 
torpedo boats.  
 
In 1887, purchased a 
revolutionary torpedo boat 
(Destroyer, ?? Kotaka) from 
Britain. In 1889, Purchased an 
armored cruisers (???
Chiyoda) from France.  
1885-88 2nd wave of expansion: 
The defeat at the Sino-French War 
led to the second “Grand 
Discussion of Seaborne Defense”. 
Although court again stressed the 
importance of seaborne defense, 
there was no increase in ordinary 
naval expenditure.  
 
Purchased 4 protected cruisers and 
7 torpedo boats from Germany and 
Britain respectively.  
(4 protected cruisers: ????
???????) 
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In 1892, purchased the fastest 
cruiser in the world (??
Yoshino) from Britain. The 
backbones of the Imperial 
Japanese Navy in the battlefield 
were formed. 
 
1893 
 
2nd long-term expansion 
program:  
Length: 7 years (1893-1900) 
Budget: 18 million yen  
Scale: 2 ironclads, 1 cruiser, and 
1 dispatch boat 
 
Before the eve of the war, the 
cabinet provided enough funds to 
purchase 3 warships from 
Argentina at a cost of over 9 
million yen and 1 battleship from 
Chile at a cost of 3 million yen. 
Those warships, while did not 
participate in the 1894’s war, 
demonstrated Meiji Japan’s great 
capacity in further strengthening 
its navy.  
1889-93 
 
Termination of expansion: 
In 1891, the Qing government 
decided to discontinue the naval 
expansion for 3 years upon the 
request of the Board of Revenue 
(??, the Ministry of Finance in 
Qing China). From then on till 
1894, the Beiyang Fleet only 
acquired one domestically-
constructed armored cruiser?? 
and did not further expand. 
 
Source:  
For Qing China: ???????????-????????????????
???2002?????????????????????????????
1984????
For Meiji Japan: Schencking, J. Charles. Making Waves: Politics, Propaganda, and 
the Emergence of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1868-1922. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2005; Ono Giichi, War and Armament Expenditures of Japan, New 
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York: Oxford University Press, 1922; ?? ???<????????????
>?????????56(1)?1990?? 21; ?? ???<?????????
????????????1881-83?>?????????(?????)?6?
2001?? 48; ?? ???<??????????????????????
??:1890-1893?>?????????(?????)?24?2010?? 99? 
 
The purpose of this research is to explain this puzzling historical divergence: given 
similar staring point, why did Qing China, by all measures of comparative 
advantages, lag behind Meiji Japan in naval buildup before the First Sino-Japanese 
War? This is not a new question. However, I argue that it deserves a reexamination as 
the existing explanations are largely inadequate. In the next chapter, I first evaluate 
two conventional explanations and find them insufficient to account for the nuances 
of Japan and China’s naval expansion policies during the two decades. Then I 
propose and conceptualize a new variable, state capacity of resource mobilization. 
Through the analyses of the two states’ respective capacities and corresponding naval 
expansion policies, I argue that the state’s resource mobilization capacity, consisting 
of taxing capacity, fiscal centralization, and borrowing capacity, can better explain 
the two countries’ varied naval buildup success.  
 
2.2 Alternative explanations 
 
A lot of scholars seek to unlock the reasons for Japan’s rise and China’s fall. In spite 
of their substantive research, there still exist several problems. First, since most of 
these studies are conducted by historians, they tend to focus on narrating general 
history and specific incidents yet seldom undertake serious causal-inquiry.5 Second, 
                                                      
5 Classical work includes: ?????????????????????1951???????
??????????????????1981??????????????????????
??????????????????????????? ??????????????????
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in spite of abundant studies of individual country, there is a severe lack of 
comparative studies that use the same set of independent variables to test the 
divergence. For example, while many Chinese scholars argue that it was the serious 
corruption that harmed the Beiyang Fleet’s competency, there is no study examining 
whether similar problem also affected the Imperial Japanese Navy. In this case, any 
causal-relations drawn from those studies could be highly-biased.  
 
To answer the central research question raised above, neoclassical realism is useful in 
providing us with the insights of how foreign and national security policy is made. 
While in line with structural realism’s insight that systemic forces create incentives 
for all states to strive for providing security for themselves, neoclassical realism 
argues that the systemic imperatives must filter through the medium of state structure 
and be affected by how top officials assess likely threats, identify viable strategies in 
response to those threats, and ultimately extract and mobilize the societal resources 
necessary to implement and sustain those strategies. For instance, purely systemic 
explanations of foreign policy presume a reasonably accurate apprehension by 
officials of the distribution of power and a direct translation of such apprehensions 
into national policy, but in realities those officials may fail to accurately perceive the 
power shift and/or be prohibited to take action due to internal fragmentations.6 In 
addition, to balance against others, states are also assumed to have an unlimited 
capacity to mobilize resources from society, whereas in fact national leaders may not 
                                                      
????????????????????????????????????????????Liu 
Kwang-ching. “British-Chinese Steamship Rivalry in China, 1873-85,” The Economic Development of 
China and Japan, edited by C. D. Cowan. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1964. Deng Gang. 
Maritime Sector, Institutions, and Sea Power of Premodern China. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1999. John, L. Rawlinson. China’s Struggle for Naval Development: 1839-1895. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1967.  
6 For representative work, see Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of 
Relative Decline, 1895-1905. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Randall L. Schweller. 
Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on The Balance of Power. (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2008) 
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have easy access to a country’s total resources. Therefore, we must take into 
consideration both the systemic-level variables and unit-level ones to pursue a less 
parsimonious yet more accurate theory of foreign policy.7   
 
In the following section, I select two common explanations, namely the “national 
security decision-making” thesis and “economic modernization” thesis that generally 
fit into the neoclassical realist framework, and I argue that neither of them is 
adequate to explain the Sino-Japanese naval divergence. First, the national security 
decision-making thesis overstates the difference in the two countries’ attitudes 
toward naval defense and in their decision-making capacity. Second, while the 
economic modernization thesis rightly points out the importance of resource, it 
oversimplifies the complicated relationship between economic development and the 
amount of resource the state able to control. Last, inspired by the “fiscal-military 
state” approach, I propose a more three-dimensional variable, state capacity of 
resource mobilization, as the primary reason behind Meiji Japan and Qing China’s 
divergent naval buildup.  
 
2.2.1 National security decision-making  
 
The first common explanation traces the Sino-Japanese naval divergence to the two 
countries’ national security decision-making capacity. In brief, scholars holding this 
thesis argue that the Japanese statesmen put more weight on national security and 
developing its seapower than their Chinese counterparts, who held a relatively 
indifferent attitude, only passively responded after security crises, and focused more 
                                                      
7 For representative work, see Thomas J. Christensen, “Perceptions and Alliances in Europe, 1865-
1940,” International Organization 51, no. 1 (1997): 65-97; Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: 
The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). 
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on landpower. The difference is evidently reflected in the two countries’ institutional 
settings. In Meiji Japan, the Ministry of Navy (??? K?????????) was founded 
soon after the Restoration as an independent ministry participating in the highest-
level decision-making. Later, the General Staff (???? S??????????) was 
established to take charge of strategic planning and military operation, ensuring that 
the military would stay above political parties’ maneuvering, and would be loyal 
directly to the emperor rather than to a prime minister who might attempt to usurp 
the emperor’s authority.8 These institutions adding up together are said to make 
military buildup top priority in state agenda. By contrast, Qing China’s institutions 
were rarely updated in spite of the increased foreign threats. On the one hand, there 
was no independent department for managing naval affairs. Instead, the 
responsibility of naval buildup was delegated to two governors-general (??), who 
were heavily burdened with the planning and administration of all relevant affairs. 
Even though a Board of Navy (????) was set up in 1885, it was primarily an 
administrative institution that did not enjoy the decision-making power as its 
Japanese counterpart did. On the other hand, there was no centralized institution for 
national security decision-making until the very end of the Qing dynasty, which was 
likely to have delayed the state’s reaction to security challenges.9 Last, they also 
argue that Meiji Japan and Qing China diverged in their commitment to sea power 
and land power. While Meiji Japan was keen on becoming a sea power due to its 
geographic location, Qing China ruled by a nomadic Manchu clan was more willing 
to strengthen its land power, as evidenced by the court’s prioritization of the 
Reconquering of Xinjiang (??? ?) over naval defense in the middle 1870s.10 
                                                      
8 Schencking, J. Charles. Making Waves: Politics, Propaganda, and the Emergence of the Imperial 
Japanese Navy, 1868-1922. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 10-15. 
9 ???????????-??????????,? 20-38? 
10 ???<??????????>?????????1987?????? 54-71??????
??<???????????—???????????>?????????????
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Even though all these differences are valid, the influences from decision-making 
turned out to be not drastically different in the two countries. First, previous 
literatures suggest that instead of being coherent, the Japanese statesmen were 
actually divided by the “strong military” (?? ky?hei) and “wealthy nation” (??
fuk?ku) camps over how the limited resources should be deployed.11 The military’s 
privileged institutional status and direct connection with the emperor did not 
guarantee sufficient budgets for its expansion, especially when the “wealthy nation” 
camp controlled decision-making in the late 1870s.12 Conversely in Qing China, the 
existence of the conservatives did not severely impede naval expansion. Although 
officials held different opinions of learning from the west, few directly downgraded 
the importance of naval defense. A conservative official who doubted the intention of 
Li Hongzhang and advocated for stopping naval buildup was even punished by the 
Empress Dowager Cixi for “raising unreasonable charge (???????????
???)”13 As for the sea power thesis, it has been argued by naval historians that 
despite Japan’s geography as an island country, for the decades before the war, its 
navy was in a disadvantaged position in the inter-service rivalry with the army for 
resources. While in Qing China, naval buildup was only postponed for one year until 
the issue was raised up again and secured annual budgets.14 
 
                                                      
???2003?? 5??? 90-94??
11 Banno Junji and Kenichi Ohno. The Flexible Structure of Politics in Meiji Japan. The Leader, 
Elites and Coalitions Research Programme. (University of York, U.K, 2010), 1-3. 
12 Schencking, Making Waves, 24. 
13 ?????????????????????????????????????????
????????1982???? 642-645?Eastman, Lloyd, E. Ch’ing-I and Chinese Policy 
Formation during the Nineteenth Century. The Journal of Asian Studies 24, no. 4 (1965): 605.  
14 Schencking, Making Waves, 38.; ??????????????????????????
??2005?? 57?????<????????????????>?????????2017?
? 2??? 84-99? 
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In sum, a careful examination of history shows that it was not until the victory in the 
First Sino-Japanese War did the Imperial Japanese Navy start to gain power and 
prestige. Only when the first generation of Meiji oligarchs faded from the stage did 
the navy’s institutional privileges started to take full effect and gave rise to the early 
Japanese “militarism”.15 Moreover, the statement that Japan was more devoted to 
seapower while China to landpower is inaccurate. During the examined period, naval 
buildup was more of urgent response to security threat than strategic planning in both 
Meiji Japan and Qing China, and thus the national security decision-making is likely 
to have played a limited role in affecting naval buildup. Nonetheless, I do not argue 
that the impact of decision-making should be eliminated. What I suggest is that the 
decision-making capacity may carry less weight than the variable that I will propose 
later.  
 
2.2.2 Economic modernization and resource  
 
Another popular explanation is the “economic modernization” thesis that attributes 
Meiji Japan’s naval success to its ability to invest in more resources, especially fiscal 
resources.16 Indeed, building up a modern standing navy constituted great fiscal 
challenges to states in an era when naval technologies were updated at a surprising 
speed under the motivation of foreign aggression. In the 1800s, a new form of 
propulsion, the steam engine, began to transform the navies. In the 1820s, the first 
steam-powered warship was produced. And by 1850, the invention of the propeller 
                                                      
15 Shinichi Kitaoka. “The Army as a Bureaucracy: Japanese Militarism Revisited,” The Journal of 
Military History 57, no. 5 (1993): 67-72; Eleanor Westney. The Military. In Japan in Transition: From 
Tokugawa to Meiji., edited by Jansen, Marius B. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
2016), 225. 
16 ????<??????????1875-1894?>??????????????????2013
?? 84??? 595-599? 
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ship made the side-wheeler ship obsolete and freed even more deckspace to carry 
more guns. In 1855, the French introduced iron plating along the wooden hull for 
increased protection, which made wooden-hulled vessels obsolete. Again, in just five 
years, the British launched the world’s first ironclad H.M.S. Warrior, of which the 
equipment rose up the cost of naval buildup to a new level.17 By the time Meiji 
Japan and Qing China started their naval buildup, the fiscal challenges faced by the 
two countries were ever greater than before.  
 
Empirically, this argument could find strong statistical supports. As shown in Table 3, 
Meiji Japan has surprisingly invested around 1.3 times the amount of Qing China in 
naval buildup. The enormous gap in fiscal investment has undoubtably led to 
divergence in naval capability. Nonetheless, a shortcoming of this account is it rests 
on an implicit assumption that the state’s rich resource is caused by economic 
modernization. Specifically, it has been assumed that the Meiji government became 
wealthier because of its successful economic modernization and industrialization 
after a series of state-led mercantile and industrial-promotion programs following the 
Restoration.18 Whereas the Qing state never made such effort, if not interrupted the 
normal growth of private business.19 In short, there is a vague belief that economic 
modernization will naturally lead to growth in state wealth. 
 
Table 3. Total Naval Expenditure, Meiji Japan and Qing China, 1875-1894 
                                                      
17 Lambert, Andrew. D. Introduction. In Steam, Steel and Shellfire: The Steam Warship, 1815-1905, 
edited by Robert Gardiner, 1-9. London: Conway Maritime Press Ltd, 1992.  
18 For example, see Sarah. C. M. Paine. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Perceptions, Power, 
and Primacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2003. Chapter 2????????????-
???????????????????2002?????????????????????
????????1981???????????????????????????????
??1984??????? 
19 Whether early Meiji Japan was a “developmental state” is still debated by political economists and 
is not the focus of this study. 
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Country Qing China Meiji Japan 
 
Expenditure 
 
57.47 million tael* 
 
118.52 million yen 
(equals to 75 million tael^) 
 
*The naval expenditure of Qing China includes the expenditure of Nanyang Fleet 
and Fujian Navy, which roughly costs one third the amount of Beiyang Fleet 
according the estimation of ???? 
^The exchange rate of the Japanese yen to Qing Kuping tael of silver is about 1.4:1, 
which is derived from????<??????????>??????????
75??1998? 3???? 65? 
Source: Meiji Japan: Ono Giichi, War and Armament Expenditures of Japan, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1922: pp. 24, 46; Qing China: ???<?????
?????1875-1894?>??????????????????2013?? 84
??? 596? 
 
While such argument looks reasonable from surface, the relationship between 
economics and state resource is likely to be more unidirectional in practices. Indeed, 
economic development, including the growth of economic size and modernization of 
economic structure, could surely contribute to state wealth by expanding the resource 
base for the state to tap into. The Japanese economy has experienced both rapid 
growth and structural change since the late 1870s. The economy grew by 8 percent 
from 1875 to 1880. Agriculture and small-scale industries have achieved higher 
productivity, partially owing to government investments in the dissemination of 
western technologies and equipment. But two problems still exist. First, despite 
growth in economy, the sheer size of economy of Meiji Japan was still less than that 
of Qing China, and the country has not yet been industrialized but remained largely a 
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pre-modern, rural setting until the early twentieth century.20 Last and most important, 
economic development could never be automatically translated into state wealth 
without state’s intentional extraction and mobilization, which sometimes matters 
even more than the economic growth. For instance, the two European naval powers, 
the seventeenth-century United Provinces of Holland and the eighteenth-century 
British state, are both relatively small in size yet so successful internationally to 
compete with states with substantially more demographic and economic resources. 
Therefore, a strong state able to effectively mobilize a large sum of resources from 
the society does not necessarily have a larger and more industrialized economy. 
Although economic growth surely matters for state’s fiscal strength, the two can 
never be correlated in any directional way. No conclusion could be drawn before 
carefully examining how exactly the state extract or mobilize resources from the 
society.  
 
2.2.3 The “fiscal-military state” approach  
 
While studying how states manage to build up military power, the “fiscal-military 
state” approach has been widely used by historians of European states to explain the 
rise and fall of great powers. A fiscal-military state is defined as one that is capable 
of sustaining large-scale military buildup and warfare through strengthening its fiscal 
capacity. During the seventeenth and eighteenth century, theaters of war extended 
globally and armies and navies grew in size and sophistication. The cost of warfare 
spiraled and the ability of states to pay for warfare determined whether they could 
become a great power in European or global conflicts. Fiscal strength, in the words 
                                                      
20 Kazushi Ohkawa, M. Shinohara, M. Umemura, M. Ito, T. Noda. The Growth Rate of the Japanese 
Economy since 1878. (Tokyo: Kinokuniya Bookstore Co. Ltd., 1957), 23. 
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of John Brewer who invented the concept of “fiscal-military state”, equals to “the 
sinews of power” of the state.21  
 
The term fiscal-military state has soon proven to be a rich vein for subsequent 
historians. In just a few years, it began to be used in a variety of cases beyond the 
original territory and time period. For example, Jan Glete argues that in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth century Spanish, Dutch and Swedish states were the earliest fully 
fledged fiscal-military states in Europe. Gausdal then incorporates the seventeenth-
century Denmark and Norway into the list. Afterwards, the list has been extended to 
England before 1688, China from 771 BCE to 220 BCE, the sixteenth-century 
Russia, and the nascent United States.22 
 
Despite the accumulation of case studies, the very success of the fiscal-military state 
concept has also brought its own pitfalls. Without sufficient attention paid to the core 
institutional elements of the fiscal military state by researchers, who are usually 
historians, the concept has been loosely applied to analyze very different cases that 
bear little relationship with each other. Consequently, the lack of clarity has made the 
                                                      
21 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, 201. 
22 For Spain, Dutch Republic and Sweden, see Jan Glete, War and the State in Early Modern Europe: 
Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal-Military States, 1500-1660 (London & New York: 
Routledge, 2002), 66. For Denmark and Norway, see Gausdal RL, “The increasing power of the state 
and the Norwegian governor general in the seventeenth century,” Historisk Tidsskrift 84, no. 1(2005): 
35. For England before 1688, see Michael Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England, c. 
1550-1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 177. For China, see Michael Mann, 
"Putting the Weberian State in its Social, Geopolitical and Militaristic Context: A Response to Patrick 
O’Brien," Journal of Historical Sociology 19, no. 4 (2006): 370. For Russia, see Chester Dunning and 
Norman Smith, “Moving beyond Absolutism: Was Early Modern Russia a “Fiscal-Military” State”, 
Russian History 33, no. 1(2006): 43. For U.S., see Max Edling, A Revolution in Favor of Government. 
Origins of the U.S. constituion and the Making of the American State (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), 220. 
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concept blurry. To enable more meaningful cross-national comparisons, in the 
coming part I will try to emphasize three important determinants of efficient fiscal 
military state and introduce a new concept, state capacity of resource mobilization, to 
explain the Sino-Japanese naval divergence. 
 
2.3 A three-dimensional approach: State Capacity of Resource 
Mobilization 
 
What determine how much resource a state could effectively mobilize, if the size and 
structure of economy could not fully explain? The Weberian definition of state led to 
a predominant focus on the role of bureaucracy among existing studies. Specifically, 
they propose that a merit-based, functionally organized, and technically qualified 
professional bureaucracy contribute to a strong state.23 However, solely relying on 
bureaucracy is risky as it not only overlooks many alternative methods of resource 
mobilization like borrowing, but also ignores the complicated state structure that 
exists between the bureaucracy and the central government. As stated above, neither 
could another frequently-used measurement, the gross domestic production (GDP) 
per capita, serve as a good enough indicator of how much resource a state could 
mobilize. Then what determine whether a state could effectively mobilize a large 
sum of resources? Drawing from existing research of the fiscal-military states, I 
propose three important determinants of state capacity in resource mobilization: 
taxing capacity, fiscal centralization, and borrowing capacity. They together shall 
enable states to effectively mobilize a large amount of fiscal resources to suffice the 
huge demands from war preparation. 
 
                                                      
23 Francis Fukuyama. “What is Governance?” Governance 26, no.3 (2013): 347–354.  
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2.3.1 Revenue collection: taxing capacity 
 
There are many ways by which states could squeeze resources out of their citizens, 
and taxation is likely to be the most important one of these devices. Economic 
historians have charted the transition over a long period from what has been called 
the “domain state”, in which most revenue derives from crown-owned property, such 
as royal estates, forests, and mines, to the tax state in which majority of state revenue 
comes from taxation. The transformation from domain state to tax state is deemed as 
a remarkable change as taxation provides an expanding, regular source of revenues 
for the state and its extraction has greatly enhanced state’s penetration into the 
society.24 
 
What determine a state’s capacity of taxing? First, administrative capacity matters 
for a state to effectively tax its economy. Bureaucracy is the tool of politicians to 
implement policies they have planned. When politicians decide to finance all or part 
of the military by tax revenue, they turn to their bureaucracy to extract resources 
from society. Therefore, the ability of bureaucracy to effectively implement policy is 
important in determining whether the policy programs can be carried out in the way 
it was planned.25 One example of the effect of administrative capacity on tax 
collection is British and French financing of the Anglo-French Wars. Initially, both 
states contracted out tax collection to a private consortium of tax farmers, who were 
proved inefficient as they took a large amount of collected revenue as payment. Over 
near hundred years of war with France, the British government gradually eliminated 
                                                      
24 E. Ladewig Petersen, “From domain state to tax state,” Scandinavian Economic History Review 23, 
no. 2(1975): 118. 
25 Carpenter, D. P. The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks and Policy 
Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 36. 
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its reliance on tax farming and replaced it with employees of state departments who 
were characterized by a number of features of modern bureaucracy. As the state 
developed a comprehensive system of record-keeping, defined office procedures and 
routine, and attracted increasingly inbred and institutionally loyal administrators, 
these bureaucrats displayed increased skill and efficiency in the extraction of taxes, 
especially that of excise duties. The administrative reform contributed to the 
impressive growth in total excise revenues in Britain during the eighteenth century.26 
Conversely, the French government, while having a much larger economy, was 
unable to make the necessary reforms to its tax administration and was thus unable to 
derive more revenues from taxation as a source of war finance.27  
 
Nonetheless, states are usually not at its will to invest in administrative capacity as 
they are simultaneously constrained by social resistance to tax burden. As Margret 
Levi argues, states’ revenue maximization drive is always subject to societal 
resistance, which may take the institutional channel or expressed in a violent form.28 
In this case, states may either not have the autonomy in deciding tax rate or face high 
political costs when trying to increase tax rates. Eventually, states’ revenue 
maximization drive is subject to the constraints of their relative bargaining power 
against corresponding societal groups who bear the tax burden. 
 
Notably, the requirement of administrative capacity and intensity of social resistance 
always vary by the type of taxes to be collected. For instance, the extraction of tariffs 
                                                      
26 Patrick K. O’Brien. “Fiscal exceptionalism: Great Britain and its European rivals from Civil War to 
triumph at Trafalgar and Waterloo.” In The Political Economy of British Historical Experience 1688-
1914, edited by Winch, Donald and O’Brien, Patrick, 245-266. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003. 
27 Kennedy, P. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 
1500 to 2000. (New York: Random House, Inc., 1987), 27. 
28 Margret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 25. 
 22 
usually requires less administrative capacity than that of domestic taxes, for tariffs 
could be centrally collected at ports and on narrow bands of the economy, and thus 
the types of administrative capacity and political compliance necessary for its 
collection are rather different than those associated with domestic taxes. In terms of 
social resistance, direct taxes, due to its relative salient nature and involvement of a 
large population basis, are usually more politically sensitive than indirect taxes levied 
on certain social groups occupying a smaller proportion of population. For example, 
instead of taxing the entire population, the British government selectively picked 
certain social groups and commodities to bear the mounting extractions of the state. 
As a result, the assessment and collection of taxes within the British kingdom 
provoked only the mildest of political crises over the eighteenth century. The 
strategic distribution of tax burden was the key to the state’s ability to make rising 
taxation tolerable and politically manageable from 1660 to 1815.29 
 
2.3.2 Fiscal Centralization 
 
The second and often overlooked determinant is the degree of fiscal centralization, 
namely, the extent to which the government could centralize the control of state 
resources. Fiscal centralization is important to be considered due to the existence of 
competing agents within the state structure. State is not a monolithic entity but often 
has a complex structure both horizontally in terms of numerous ministries and 
vertically in terms of different levels of government. Frequently, the central 
government had to rely on local agents for both revenue collection and allocation. 
However, fiscal decentralization happened when the local governments (the agents) 
do not share the central government (the principal)’s aims, or in other words, when 
                                                      
29 Patrick K. O’Brien, “The Rise of a Fiscal State in England, 1485-1815,” Historical Research 66, 
no. 106 (1993): 165. 
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there exists an asymmetry of preference. Under such circumstances, revenues are 
likely to not be collected or/and spent for the purposes that the central government 
intends to. Therefore, one must go beyond the taxing capacity to examine the central-
local fiscal relation in order to understand how much resource the central 
government could actually deploy. This is particularly important here because 
modern naval buildup is usually the responsibility of central government, and it is 
eventually the portion of state revenue that the central government can control that 
determines whether naval buildup could be successfully carried out. 
 
There are multiple ways to achieve fiscal centralization. First, the central government 
may choose to enhance its supervision over local administrations in revenue 
collection and allocation. However, monitoring local governments’ activities is a 
formidable task for pre-modern states because of the potential asymmetry in 
information caused by spatial distance and restriction of transportation and 
technologies. In practice, monitoring revenue collection of local bureaucrats may be 
susceptible to corruption and venality, and its dependency on the possibilities of 
communication with regions outside the administrative center, and on the viability 
and efficacy of sanctions could all make supervision a difficult and ineffective. In 
this case, a more feasible option is to minimize local agents’ involvement in the 
collection of important revenue and resource allocation. Specifically, instead of 
solely depending on local administrations to collect revenues, the central government 
could gain firmer control of valuable source of revenue by replacing local tax 
administration with centrally-dispatched bureaucrats that are directly responsible to 
the center. Additionally, rather than entrusting the task of resource allocation to local 
agents, the central government may establish a central institution (usually treasury or 
central bank) and order local governments to remit majority of their collected 
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revenues to it for centralized allocation. These reforms would leave local 
governments with less fiscal autonomy and thus enhance the central government’s 
control of state resources. 
 
In the case of the eighteen-century Europe, the development of a sizeable civilian 
administration to centrally manage states’ fiscal activities is another salient character 
of the most capable fiscal-military state. While public finance remained decentralized 
through most of the 1700s, centralization took place swiftly and permanently 
throughout much of the continent from 1789 onwards.30 Again, Britain was a highly 
centralized state in which state revenues were exceptionally well controlled by the 
bookkeepers in Whitehall. Specifically, the British central government succeeded in 
producing a remarkably centralized fiscal system in which all state departments, 
those of both receipt and disbursement, were accountable to the Treasury Board, this 
enabled Britain to become the first state to keep full accounts of total government 
revenue and expenditure. Additionally, it also centralized the collection of the most 
important source of revenue-the excise duties. These reforms have facilitated 
Britain’s effective resource mobilization for investing in military buildup. In sharp 
contrast, the United Provinces of Holland, despite being another capable fiscal-
military state, was highly decentralized as the seven provinces still retained 
considerable fiscal autonomy. Revenues were entirely collected and controlled by 
regional authorities who shared a proportion upward for or a common purpose under 
negotiated agreements. The fiscal decentralization of Holland is said to have 
contributed to its defeat in war with Napoleon. Since each province attempted to free 
ride on the tax contributions of others, revenues controlled by the republic 
                                                      
30 Mark Dincecco. “Fiscal Centralization, Limited Government, and Public Revenues in Europe, 
1650-1913,” The Journal of Economic History 69, no. 1 (2009): 52. 
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government were inadequate to cover the huge interests generated from wartime 
debts. Similarly, in France, the Royal Treasury was receiving only half of the state’s 
total revenues as late as 1788.31 
 
2.3.3 Borrowing capacity 
 
Borrowing is another important mean for state to mobilize resource. Both European 
naval powers, the United Provinces of Holland and its British successor, were 
extraordinary borrowers capable of borrowing heavily at relatively low rates of 
interest and over a long term.32 In Britain, it was the well-organized system of public 
borrowing, so greatly superior to that of France, which made it possible for the 
government to tap the country’s wealth for war purposes far more effectively than 
could have been done by taxation alone. In their summative book, Bonney and 
Ormrod distinguished a “fiscal state” from “tax state” by “the capacity to borrow 
sums on a scale unthinkable in earlier eras without any significant debt reduction.”33 
Comparing with taxation, borrowing is an innovative technique that enables the state 
to instantly extract societal wealth on a wholly new scale without going through the 
formidable process of bargaining with social groups.34 The more a government can 
borrow, the greater its immediate ability to carry out its chosen policies.  
 
Of the various forms of borrowing, the long-term bonds that do not need to be 
redeemed within a short period is deemed as the most desirable one. The so-called 
                                                      
31 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, 17. 
32 Karen A. Rasler and Willam R. Thompson. “Global Wars, Public Debts, and The Long Cycle,” 
World Politics 35, no.4 (1983): 489-516. 
33 Richard Bonney. The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe c.1200-1815. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 2. 
34 Wantje Fritschy. Public Finance of the Dutch Republic in Comparative Perspective: The Viability 
of an Early Modern Federal State (1570s-1795). (Leiden: Brill Press, 2017), 25. 
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“Financial Revolution” in Britain (1693-1720) was marked exactly by the 
replacement of short-term debt with long-term bonds secured by specific sources of 
revenue.35 In other words, it was a transformation of debt redeemable at a short 
notice into debt that either need never be redeemed or need only be repaid some 
years hence. The funded long-term bonds are superior than the short-term ones in 
three aspects. First, subscribers to the bonds were paid back annually over long-
periods, which helped the government to finance the immediate needs of war on a 
relatively small and inelastic revenue base. While tax revenues may not be 
sufficiently elastic to finance urgent demands of war, they would suffice to pay the 
interest on long-term bonds, for which the government was not bound to repay the 
principal before a distant date. Second, the bonds were “funded”, meaning that 
government set aside specific revenues to meet interest payments, a feature that 
further enhanced confidence in lending to the government. Third, the funded debt 
allowed the government to borrow large sums to finance wars via a policy of tax 
smoothing. Financing wartime expenditures by borrowing, then servicing and 
amortizing the debt by taxation in peacetime, lowers the total costs of resource 
mobilization because it produces fewer distortions in the investment decisions of 
private economic agents. 
What affects a state’s ability to borrow? Case studies of Dutch Republic and Britain, 
which possessed the most outstanding borrowing power in the seventeenth century 
Europe, demonstrate that a state’s ability to float bonds would be contingent on its 
creditworthiness and availability of effective financial institutions. Firstly, North and 
Weingast argued that the 1688 English Glorious Revolution enhanced the state’s 
creditworthiness by putting institutional constraints on the monarchs’ behaviors. The 
                                                      
35 Peter. G. M. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the Development of Public 
Credit, 1688-1756. (London: The Macmillan Press, 1967), 46. 
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political reform restored the parliament as the political and financial watchdog by 
inhibiting future monarchs from arbitrary taxation, confiscations, or repudiations of 
debt, therefore sending security signals to potential investors who now worried less 
about the monarch’s default.36 Secondly, other than power-checking institutions, 
state’s creditworthiness is also deeply connected with its ability to make punctual 
interest payments to creditors. Britain’s effective tax system was a prerequisite of the 
large-scale borrowing that revolutionized state finance.37 As argued by Brewer, 
these 60,000 British public creditors to whom the state owed money at the outbreak 
of the Seven Years War chose to invest in government bonds precisely because they 
were secure, and their warranty was not only the pledge of king, lords, and commons 
to honor the debt, but also the ability of tax collectors to service it.38 Fiscal  
centralization is also crucial for enhancing state’s aggregate borrowing capacity. For 
example, in the case of the Dutch Republic, Holland’s financial revolution had been 
based upon the decentralized, strong financial tradition of the town that had managed 
large-scale loans through annuities at least since the fourteenth century. Although in 
the sixteenth century that tradition had been upgraded to encompass the whole 
Holland province, in no way could tax revenues from the other six provinces be used 
to service the creditors in mainly Holland towns. This decentralized setting in the 
long run proved to be a disadvantage.39 In short, it is important for the central 
government to secure a large proportion of revenues to be used as capital to leverage 
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long-term fiscal resources from the markets.  
 
Second, financial institutions can also contribute directly and indirectly to state’s 
borrowing capacity. Firstly, an integrated financial system would facilitate borrowing 
by channeling available public credit to the state. Debt is not necessarily a bilateral 
relation between the government and the creditor who retains the debt until maturity. 
It can also be a financial product bought and sold on the financial market. 
Alternatively, government can also issue debts on the financial markets without 
establishing any special relationship with its creditors. In this case, creditors do not 
buy government debt to hold it until it matures but to sell it at a profit at any time. 
The advantage of this development for the government was that issuing debts on 
financial markets increased the number of potential investors and could reduce the 
price that government had to pay for its debt in stable times.40 Secondly, certain 
financial institutions sometimes also directly enhance state’s borrowing power. For 
instance, the Bank of England was primarily established as an instrument to enhance 
government’s urgent fund raising. Unlike today’s independent central bank, the Bank 
of England was established as a joint-stock company that provided long-term credit 
to the financially exhausted government in return for a monopoly on issuing 
banknotes as legal tender. With its monopoly of currency issuance, the bank helped 
the government to transform its debt into paper notes circulated in the economy.41 
 
In the remaining chapters, I examine the evolution of Meiji Japan and Qing China’s 
resource mobilization capacity and naval buildup policies. I argue that the divergence 
                                                      
40 Jenny Preunkert. “Financialization of government debt? European government debt management 
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in naval buildup was primarily caused by their growing gap in resource mobilization 
capacity. To be specific, after the Meiji Restoration, Japan not only expanded its 
resource base by improving taxing capacity, but also gained firmer control over state 
resource through centralizing the fiscal system. Furthermore, the government was 
able to quickly mobilize resources through long-term borrowing in domestic market, 
which helped the state to afford the multiyear naval buildup programs and urgent 
wartime mobilization when tax revenue alone was inadequate. By contrast, the  
post-Taiping Rebellion fiscal decentralization deprived the Qing central government 
of the de facto control of state resources. While the center could still use its political 
authority to press more revenues from provinces, the stagnated tax revenue and 
limited borrowing capacity made it hard for local governments to raise sufficient 
resource to meet the center’s growing spending demands. Therefore, despite the Qing 
court repeatedly stressed the importance of naval buildup, its weak resource 
mobilization capacity has largely prohibited the buildup of a powerful navy that 
could fight at sea.  
 
 
 
Chapter 3. Meiji Japan 
 
In this chapter, I argue that Meiji Japan’s successful naval buildup is largely 
attributed to its rapidly-improved resource mobilization capacity. After the Meiji 
Restoration, the new government actively sought to increase revenue by launching a 
series of fiscal reforms. First, it achieved fiscal centralization through establishing a 
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central treasury to directly receive and centrally allocate majority of state revenues. 
Meanwhile, administrations of land taxes and indirect taxes were reformed to 
increase tax revenue. In particular, the Ministry of Finance centralized the 
assessment and collection of alcohol taxes to make it an important source of state 
revenue. Finally, the enhanced state creditworthiness and establishment of a central 
bank enabled the central government to rapidly mobilize a large sum of resources 
from domestic financial market. All these efforts together made Japan a strong state 
capable of supporting the expensive naval buildup in the late nineteenth century.   
 
3.1 Historical Background: Early naval buildup and fiscal distress 
 
The early Japanese rulers were not devoted to becoming a seapower. Throughout the 
medieval period, water force organized by rival clans in the internal factional 
struggles and the widespread privateering on the Inland Sea constituted the only 
significant naval units in premodern Japan. Even the surge of overseas expansionism 
in the sixteenth century did little to contribute to the development of Japan as a 
seapower. Although the ferocious half pirates, half traders wa?? stormed along the 
coasts of Korea and China and even into the ports of Southeast Asia, most of their 
fighting was inland and their tactics are more relevant to land warfare than to sea.42 
In a way similar with Qing China, the two and a half centuries’ isolation from all but 
minimal contact with the West contributed to Japan’s serious strategic and 
technological disadvantage in naval defense.  
 
Situation began to change since the early nineteenth century. When Qing China was 
defeated in the Opium War of 1842, the worry that the British would soon use the  
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same gunboat diplomacy to open the door of Japan first occurred to some of the 
Japanese leadership. More immediately, Japan was forced to learn the lesson when 
the U.S. Commodore Perry arrived in 1853 with four warships at the Edo Bay. The 
totally unprepared Tokugawa shogunate was shocked into recognizing the extreme 
vulnerability of Japan to foreign aggression from sea. With only a collection of sail- 
and oar-powered coastal crafts and a few vintage cannons scattered along the 
coastline, and a complete absence of naval personnel who understood the 
requirements of modern naval war, the shogunate was forced to accept Perry’s 
demands for ending Japan’s long isolation.43 Now faced with the threat of further 
Western encroachments on Japan’s sovereignty, both the shogunate and major 
domains became preoccupied with naval defense, and belated efforts were made to 
acquire Western naval armament, technology, and training.  
 
Nonetheless, fiscal decentralization had inhibited the development of a powerful 
naval force. Under the rule of Tokugawa shogunate, despite that the shogun in theory 
had control over all land, the domains still preserved large degree of fiscal autonomy. 
The shogunate only collected taxes in territories under its direct governance (??
bakufu), while daimyos were allowed to collect all the taxes and control the 
economic decisions within their territories, as long as they paid a portion of revenues 
to the shogunate. This decentralized fiscal system let the shogunate choose a 
decentralized way to construct navy: Instead of developing a unified national navy, 
the shogunate delegated the responsibility of defense to several strategically placed 
domains, of which the most important being Satsuma, ??????, Hizen, and Tosa. 
Consequently, both the size and strength of the naval forces were heterogeneous. The 
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shogunate and coastal domains relied on different models for naval construction. 
While the shogunate amassed a force of eight warships and thirty-six auxiliaries with 
the assistance from the Dutch and French governments, Satsuma chose the British 
model and assembled a force of nine foreign-built steam-powered ships. Although 
their accumulated efforts were impressive, the decentralized vessels were hardly the 
basis for a strong, centralized national navy. Moreover, the qualities of the purchased 
ships were also in question. As an American shipbuilder Joseph H. Longford 
described, Japan at that time was “the recognized market for the disposal of obsolete 
and worn-out ships of every degree, both mercantile and naval.”44 Many warships, 
in fact, were nothing more than barges suitable only for transporting ground units. 
 
In November 1867, the Tokugawa regime was toppled by the Restoration forces and 
the Meiji government was inaugurated. The following four years witnessed 
significant institutional changes in naval history: In 1871, Japan finally had a 
centrally-administered naval force when Satsuma, ??????, Tosa, and Hizen donated 
their navies to the new government, marking the institutional beginning of the 
Imperial Japanese Navy. In June of the same year, under the urge of Satsuma 
statesmen, the Ministry of Military (??? h????-???) was separated into two 
independent ministries of army (??? rikugun-???) and navy (??? kaigun-s??), 
and henceforce ended the navy’s institutional subservience to the army.45  
 
Nonetheless, institutional reforms did not instantly lead to growth in naval strength. 
In spite of the emperor’s proclamation that “the establishment of the navy and army 
were matters of utmost urgency”, the new government failed to undertake any 
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significant expansion program before 1882. The stagnated naval buildup was 
primarily caused by the government’s dire fiscal situation. During the first few years 
of the new regime, state expenditure soared because of the costs incurred in crushing 
the shogunate force. Meanwhile, revenues from taxes were not yet available. While 
total state expenditure amounted to 25 million yen in 1868, ordinary revenue was no 
more than 3.7 million yen. As the borrowings from big merchant houses (???
goyokin) only amounted to 5.4 million, the Meiji government had no choice but to 
print a total value of 48 million yen paper notes (???? dajokansatsu) to cover its 
expenditures. Since the government did not have enough specie reserves, these paper 
notes were de facto inconvertible. The proportion of inconvertible paper notes in 
government total revenue was as high as 72.6 percent during January to September 
1869. To make things worse, the abolition of the domains (???? haihan chigen) 
in August 1871 made the central government burdened with the accumulated debts of 
the domains and the huge hereditary perpetual stipends for domain lords and 
samurais. As the center was not yet able to tax the entire economy, it decided to 
convert the stipends into government compensation bonds (???? kinroku kosai). 
In exchange for their regular stipends, approximately 310,000 ex-samurai received 
state bonds worth 173.9 million yen under a wide variety of conditions that included 
interest rates of 5 percent, 6 percent, 7 percent or 10 percent and an interest receipt 
period of 5 to 14 years. The total amount of the compensation bonds was more than 
30 percent of the annual government expenditure in 1876 and need to be redeemed in 
thirty years.46 
 
The precarious fiscal situation of the central government significantly delayed naval 
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buildup progress. In 1872, when the Naval Vice-Minister Kawamura Sumiyoshi 
recommended that 20 percent of tariff revenue secured at Yokohama and other treaty 
ports to be used for military expansion, with the navy securing the largest amount, 
other leaders rejected his proposal and any hope for even the modest expansion 
requests. In May and October of the same year, the government again rejected 
Kawamura’s three-ship proposal strictly on financial consideration. Once again in 
January 1873, Navy Minister Katsu ??????’s outright expansion program of 104 
vessels was rejected for the same reason. As claimed by the state councilors, it would 
be “fiscally impossible” for the young regime to implement such ambitious 
program.47 
 
Meanwhile, to avoid more costs from war to further harm state’s fiscal health, the 
new government also tried hard to prevent the hardliner from realizing foreign 
aggression. In 1873, fiscal difficulties forced some Meiji leaders to unite together to 
reject the hardliner’s proposal to invade Korea. At that time, the Supreme 
Commander ?????????????? was under great pressure from soldiers who were left 
with nothing to do after overthrowing the shogunate and urged for foreign conquest. 
Using Korea’s rejection of Japan’s request to sign a commercial treaty, ????? 
advocated for sending a plenipotentiary envoy to Korea and himself be given 
plenipotentiary powers for this purpose. However, their “Korea Invasion” (???
Seikanron) proposal was eventually halted by ????????????????, who just came 
back from the western learning tour (?????? Iwakura Mission) and preferred to 
prioritize “industrialization”.48 In his famous critique of the war proposal in October 
1873, ????? argued: 
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Today government expenditures are tremendous, which our incomes cannot cover. 
If we open fire and send several tens of thousands of men abroad, we will incur 
enormous expenses. This will require heavy taxes or foreign loans or the issuance 
of paper money, which will lead to higher prices, social unrest and uprisings…Our 
government has just started to stimulate industries, and it will take several years 
before we get results…If we now begin an unnecessary war, spend a huge amount 
of money, shed blood, and worsen the daily life of people, all these government 
works will break like a bubble and lose several decades of time.49 
 
Apparently, the war in the eyes of ??????was “unnecessary” under government 
fiscal deficits. For him, the two national goals “wealthy nation” and “strong military” 
became separable when the state only had limited resources. Later ????? and ????? 
compromised toward sending an expedition troop to Taiwan, where fifty-four 
???????islanders were murdered by local inhabitants in November 1871. Although a 
troop of 3,600 men and six warships were dispatched, the battle was small in scale 
with less than fifty causalities on both sides.50 The potential large-scale war was 
purposefully averted by ?????’s five-round-negotiation with Chinese officials in 
Beijing. Again, in September 1875 when a small-scale violent conflict broke out 
between several Japanese survey ships and the Korea government (?????
Kanghwado Incident), ??????skillfully adopted diplomatic strategies to prevent the 
conflict from being escalated. He carefully appointed the moderate Finance    
Vice-Minister Inoue Kaoru to accompany the hardline Director of the H????????
Colonization Office Kuroda Kiyotaka to the treaty negotiation with Korea 
government under the consideration of “giving overall priority to peace.”51 
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In sum, during the first few decades after the Meiji Restoration, naval expansion was 
largely constrained by the government’s fiscal shortage. Before early 1880s, naval 
expenditure was kept as low as 5.5 percent of the total state expenditure. No    
long-term expansion program was carried out, and oversea purchases were only 
sporadic. Except from domestic construction, the Meiji government only purchased a 
small ironclad (Fuso) and two coast defense warships from Britain (Kongo, Hiei) in 
1875, which hardly made the Imperial Japanese Navy a strong force in comparison 
with Qing China’s more advanced Beiyang Fleet before the mid-1880s.52 Only after 
a series of fiscal reforms taking effects did Meiji Japan acquire the capacity that 
allows long-term investment in naval expansion.  
 
3.2 Fiscal centralization 
 
The government first reformed the decentralized fiscal operation. Prior to the 
abolishment of domains, local governments’ finances were almost independent from 
the center’s surveillance. The daimyos had considerable autonomy in making fiscal 
decisions within their territories. Specifically, they were allowed to decide their own 
tax rate and spending as long as they paid the required amount of revenues to the 
shogunate. Accordingly, the daimyos were also fiscally self-responsible, obligated to 
pay for the stipends of their subordinates and the provision of public goods such as 
building roads, castles and irrigation systems.53  
 
After the abolishment of domains, to centralize the control of state revenue, the 
central government first enhanced the supervision of local governments’ finances. In 
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1873, Inoue Kaoru introduced double-entry bookkeeping into government finance 
and required local governments to regularly submit their account books and budgets 
for the next year to the Ministry of Finance for inspection. To further enhance the 
control of resource allocation, the central government ordered private bankers to 
transfer majority of tax revenues from localities to a central Treasury. Initially, fifty 
traditional private bankers, such as Mitsui, Yasuda and Ono, were delegated to send 
the collected taxes to Tokyo by bills of exchange. Their local branches received the 
rice from peasants and sent bills to headquarters in Tokyo. Serving as the 
government’s money transmitters, these bankers benefited from doing governmental 
business as it provided them with additional money with no need to pay interest for a 
brief period. Nonetheless, as these bankers often lent out government deposit for 
profits, they became unprepared when the government suddenly needed large amount 
of money. For example, when the government called back its deposits for Taiwan 
Expedition in 1874, two of the biggest banks, Ono and Shimada houses went 
bankrupt as they failed to raise enough money immediately. Having been aware of 
this potential risk, the central government now demanded that these banks provide 
collateral for the deposited governmental funds for security. To further enhance the 
control of resource allocation, in February 1876, the Finance Minister of the time 
Okuma Shingenobo ordered local governments to return any surplus to the Ministry 
for a centralized allocation.54 By 1880, the central Treasury was receiving up to 85 
percent of state revenue through the remittance of national banks and major private 
banks. In 1886, the Bank of Japan replaced private and national banks to serve as the 
sole agent for the Treasury and further facilitated the more rapid centralized 
collection of tax revenue.55 Through these practices, majority of state revenues were 
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now remitted to the center for centralized allocation, and thus ensured the central 
government’s de facto control of state resource.  
 
3.3 Elastic tax revenue 
 
At the same time, Meiji Japan also actively sought to increase revenue from taxation. 
During the Tokugawa era, Japan was already a tax state which predominantly relied 
on land taxes and tariff. Initially, the new government attempted to increase revenues 
through raising tariff rate. On 23 December 1871, a delegation consisting of half of 
the highest-ranking officials left Japan with the main purpose of negotiating with 
Western powers for a resumption of sovereignty in deciding tariff rates. To their 
disappointment, these officials soon realized that it was unrealistic to establish tariff 
autonomy when Japan was a weak state with no bargain power.56 Other than tariff, 
the government also experimented with various ways to generate revenue and 
prevent outflow of species, such as establishing state-owned enterprises in modern  
industries, and organizing direct exports to Western markets to generate trade surplus. 
Unfortunately, almost all of them failed as the enterprises were non-profitable and 
Japanese goods were not competitive enough in foreign markets.57 As direct means 
to generate revenues failed, raising revenues from domestic taxes became the most 
plausible option. 
 
As for domestic taxes, the abolishment of domains in 1871 changed the former 
division of taxation by creating a clearer division of national and local taxes: national 
                                                      
56 Ian Nish. The Iwakura Mission to America and Europe: A New Assessment. (Talyor & Francis e-
Library, 1998), 33.  
57 Masaki Nakabayashi. “The Rise of a Japanese Fiscal state.” In The Rise of Fiscal States: A Global 
History 1500–1914, ed?Bartolome Yun-Casalilla, Patrick K. O’Brien and Francisco Comin Comin, 
378-409. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
 39 
taxes belonged to the central government now included land taxes, customs, and 
indirect taxes on major consumer goods, such as alcohol, tobacco and soy sauce. 
Local taxes constituted a prefixed ratio of land taxes and some indirect taxes such as 
retail taxes were at the disposal of municipal and prefectural governments.58 The 
government started with a reform of the land tax. Initially, following the Tokugawa 
tradition, land tax was paid by rice instead of species, and thus the revenue was 
highly unstable as harvests varied from year to year. Besides, tax was levied on 
villages as a whole rather than on individual plots, and then allocated by a 
consultative process within the village. A nationwide land tax reform was launched in 
July 1873 to curb those problems. There were three main changes it brought: first, 
land tax was to be paid in cash instead of kind. Second, the tax was now based on the 
value of land instead of the harvest, making the amount of revenue more stable. 
Third, regional variations of tax burden were eliminated. From July 1873 to the end 
of 1876, the government assessed and determined the monetary value of 85.44 
million parcels of rice paddies and all other types of land, and issued 109.33 million 
certificates of land ownership. The tax burden of each parcel was to correspond to its 
real productivity as closely as possible. Through these efforts, the complex and 
inequitable Tokugawa land tax system was replaced by a more efficient and equitable 
one.59 
 
Despite receiving much praise, the limitations of land tax became more evident when 
the government tried to raise more revenues from it. First, since the value of land was 
fixed after the assessment survey, it no longer increased as the economy grew. In 
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consequence, revenue from land taxes became perversely responsive to inflation. 
Any increase in the price level would result in a decrease in the real values of 
government revenues. Therefore, when the price of rice rose during the years   
1877-1881 and again in the 1890-1898 period, it greatly benefited the taxpayers at 
the cost of the government. In 1880 when the price of rice reached 10.49 yen per 
koku comparing to 5.01 yen in 1876, the central government was forced to consider 
reassessing the land value and reinstituting payments in rice to prevent suffering 
from de facto losses. However, neither of these changes was adopted in the end.60 
According to one estimation, the landowners’ share of the proceeds from the land 
rose from 18 percent before 1868 to 56 percent in the inflationary period of 1878-87, 
while the state’s share fell correspondingly from 50 percent to 11 percent. Godai 
Tomoatsu in the Ministry of Finance even attributed the trade deficit to peasants’ 
growing wealth. In his words: “The peasants have attained prosperity and generate 
luxury in clothing and food, and very evidently they have sufficient wealth to spend 
competitively on imported goods…But this is quickly reflected in an imbalance 
between exports and imports.”61 
 
The second limitation lies in the severe social resistance to rising land tax rate. 
During the initial assessment period, officials frequently encountered resistance and 
even uprisings from landowners who protested the “unfairness” in value assessments. 
Tax revolts against the requirement of payment in cash and in an amount not 
correlated with harvest conditions also resulted in several immediate amendments to 
the 1873 legislation, which now permitted the peasants to pay up to one-third of their 
taxes in kind. In 1877, fearing both the Seinan War and the rising peasant uprisings 
                                                      
60 Nakabayashi, The Rise of a Japanese Fiscal state, 103. 
61 Banno, Japan’s Modern History, 116. 
 41 
in Mie prefecture and elsewhere, the government again lowered land tax rate from 3 
to 2.5 percent. Later during the 1880s, a proposal of raising 25 percent tax rates was 
rejected out of the worries that the rising tax burden could further stimulate the 
peasants’ involvement in the escalating Freedom and People’s Right movement (?
????? j????minken u???), which was considered as a political threat to the 
Meiji government.62  
 
In consequence, the central government was unable to extract more revenues from 
land taxes and benefited from the growing agricultural productivities. Although the 
land tax remained the pillar of state revenue until the 1890s, its relative inelasticity 
forbids it from being further increased and thus gradually lost its importance. As the 
land tax gradually decreased its share, indirect taxes such as the tax on alcohol and 
tobacco emerged the major sources of state revenue. Regarding the indirect taxes 
levied on domestic consumer goods, since the very beginning, financial officials in 
the Meiji government considered the commercial sectors important sources of 
revenue. In the Guidance for the Administration of Cities and Prefectures issued by 
the central government in March 1869, it is clearly stated that “as commerce 
prospers, commercial taxes should be gradually collected, and we can expect a great 
success when the methods of taxing commercial sectors are ultimately formulated.”63  
 
Taking indirect tax levied on alcohol as an example, effective extraction was 
achieved through reforming and centralizing the assessment and collection. During 
the Tokugawa period, alcohol taxes used to be collected based on the average market 
price of products. However, since the evaluation of the fluctuating market value of 
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alcohol in various regions was a formidable task, officials usually did not conduct 
careful assessment themselves but relied on the self-reports of local merchants, who 
tended to underreport the true value so as to pay less taxes. To eliminate the resulted 
under taxation, in 1877, the Ministry of Finance sent out officials to supervise the 
collection of alcohol taxes and ordered brewers to regularly submit their account  
books for auditing. Initially, the task of assessment was entrusted to local magistrates, 
who were not incentivized to finish their duties of assessing the quantity of alcohol 
production wholeheartedly. As the problem of underassessment became evident in a 
field investigation conducted by the Ministry of Finance, since 1878 the Ministry 
replaced local magistrates with trained bureaucrats directly dispatched from the 
Bureau of Taxation. This time, these bureaucrats assessed and collected taxes 
according to a carefully-designed procedure. They not only measured the volume of 
alcohol containers but also checked all relevant account records. Moreover, since 
these bureaucrats were personnel of the central government, they directly reported  
the monthly output of brewing houses to the Bureau of Taxation rather than local 
governments. In doing so, by 1880, the central government eliminated the 
involvement of local administrations in the assessment and collection of alcohol  
taxes and thus firmly controlled this important source of revenue.64 
Meanwhile, the central government also tried to expand the tax basis by lifting the 
Tokugawa ban on alcohol brewing and issued more licenses. As a result, the number 
of brewing houses increased from 15 in 1866 to 253 in 1875, producing around 5 
million koku of alcohol per year, and alcohol tax revenue rose sharply from 1.68 
million yen in 1874 to 6.46 million yen in 1879.65 Nonetheless, in September 1880 
when the Meiji government raised the tax rate on alcohol production from 1 yen to 2 
                                                      
64???????????????????????????1999???? 74? 
65 1 Koku is equivalent to around 180 Litre 
 43 
yen per koku and the license fee from 5 yen to 30 yen, many small brewers who 
survived on narrow profits could not bear tax burdens, and consequently organized 
petitions to protest. However, officials in the Ministry of Finance, instead of 
responding by reducing the tax rate, considered this as an opportunity to eliminate 
the relatively uncompetitive small producers from the market. The rising tax rates 
made many small-scale producers nonprofitable and were forced to shut down, but 
big producers took the chance to expand their business, and receipts from alcohol 
taxes, instead of being reduced, rose sharply from 5.51 million yen in 1879 to 10.64 
million yen in 1881. In sum, alcohol taxes served as a reliable supplement when 
revenue from land taxes became inelastic. Moving forward to the end of nineteenth 
century, indirect taxes levied on alcohol even replaced land taxes to become the 
primary source of state revenues.66  
 
 
Table 4. Percentage of Land and Alcohol Tax Revenue in Total State Revenue 
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Source: calculated from Katsuma Ohsato, Hundred-year statistics of the Japanese 
economy, Tokyo: Statistics Department, The Bank of Japan, 1966, pp. 136.  
 
3.4 Borrowing capacity 
 
Other than financing naval expansion through regular revenues from taxation, the 
Meiji government also managed to raise a vast sum of resources from the domestic 
markets by issuing long-term state bonds at low interest rate. In total, revenues from 
the selling of four voluntary naval bonds amounting to 17 million yen, providing 
timely support for naval expansion and urgent wartime mobilization when tax 
revenues were insufficient during deflation. The punctual payment of interests 
funded by increasing tax revenues and the establishment of a central Bank of Japan 
with monopolized note issuance are critical to Meiji Japan’s successful leverage of 
financial resources from the domestic markets.  
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Meiji Japan started to experiment with long-term state bonds from the very 
beginning due to urgent fiscal pressure. The 1871 abolition of domains and the 
establishment of prefectures made the Meiji government suddenly bear all hereditary 
stipends of domain lords and samurais. As the Treasury did not have enough funds, 
the government converted these stipends into government compensation bonds to be 
redeemed within thirty years. Since 1875, tax revenues were appropriated to pay 
interests annually. As the Meiji government gradually improved its taxing capacity 
by reliably collecting indirect revenues, it demonstrated its ability to use the revenue 
to make punctual interest payments to its bonds over the next two decades. The 
stocks of redeemable state bonds became a safe investment for small investors, such 
as ex-samurais and daimyos.67 
  
The establishment of the Bank of Japan also directly and indirectly improved state 
creditworthiness and facilitated resource mobilization. The Bank of Japan was 
established in 1882 with the primary aim of issuing convertible paper notes to 
counter against the severe inflation resulting from excessive printing during the 
Seinan War. To guarantee the convertibility of the newly-issued banknotes, the 
government got rid of private banks in fiscal operation and put entire state tax 
revenues and funds under the management of the Bank of Japan. The huge amount of 
regular state tax revenue enhanced the creditability of the long-term bonds issued by 
the Bank for the government.68 Besides, as a governmental institution, the Bank of 
Japan also had the obligation to directly serve as the government’s creditors in time 
of urgency. Specifically, the Bank was placed under the control of the government, 
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which not only directly appointed the Bank’s president and directors but also 
directed the general policy of the Bank. When the war approached in 1894, the 
government promulgated an act that obligated the Bank to supply the government 
with funds on a short-term basis which would enable the latter to manage itself until 
it received proceeds of newly issued national debts. This allowed the government to 
borrow rapidly and mobilize resources by using the bank’s supremacy of currency 
issuance.69 
 
Finally, the government also skillfully adopted an innovative debt management 
method to lower the interest rate by taking advantages of the deflationary 
environment to convert multiple old debts into a new bond. The successful 
conversion of paper notes changed the whole economic aspect, and the rate of 
interest began to fall. The market rate, which oscillated between twelve and eight 
percent before, descended to seven percent. At the same time, the price of bonds 
gradually rose; Hence, the time became ripe for the conversion of the debt. In 
September 1886, Matsukata announced the Adjustment Bond (???? seiri kosai) 
Ordinance to reduce the amount of interests by converting high interest rate 
government bonds by reflecting the trend toward declining market interest rates. The 
adjustment bonds were issued in a format resembling the consolidated bonds of 
Britain. It was decided to gradually issue adjustment bonds with a total limit of 175 
million yen to convert the outstanding government bonds with an annual interest rate 
of 6 percent or more. The issue conditions were 5 percent interest bearing and  
redemption in 50 years after a deferment of five years. The deflationary environment 
also incentivized the holders of old bonds to accept interest reduction instead of 
choosing cash payment. In this way, about 74 percent of outstanding government 
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bonds worth 230 million yen were converted at of the end of 1886 into 5 percent 
interest bearing government bonds over a period of ten years, leading to an 
accumulated interest payment reduction of 2.93 million yen. The government’s fiscal 
burden has thus been greatly relieved.70 
 
3.4 Impacts on naval buildup  
 
The above reforms enabled the Japanese government to significantly increase its tax 
revenue, centralize the control of state resource, and rapidly mobilize more resource 
through borrowing domestically. With reforms in land and indirect tax 
administrations, the annual tax revenue in 1882 reached 67.7 million yen, which is 
twenty-three times of the year 1868. Of the total state revenues, over 80 percent was 
remitted to the center by the national and private banks for centralized management 
by the Ministry of Finance. Accordingly, the state became more capable to commit 
more resources to naval buildup.  
 
Before 1880s, the Imperial Japanese Navy experienced continuous failures in arguing 
for expansion budgets. Due to the defeat of the revolutionary forces at Seinan war 
and the resulting enormous fiscal burden, both the navy and army were in no position 
of asking for more budgets. While statesmen in support of industrialization were at 
the height of influence, voice from the ‘strong military’ camp had disappeared for a 
while. The subordinary position of the military was demonstrated in an extreme form 
in the following extract from a statement of budgetary demands by the Ministry of 
Army in 1878, in which the Army Minister acknowledged that “in the case of 
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expenditure on the army, it is like throwing money into water and fire, since hardly 
any of this money is repaid even in the long term. Talking just in financial terms, we 
belong to a useless behemoth, and there are even people who argue that the armed 
forces ought to be disbanded.” Although this quote was an introductory section and it 
later followed a call for military expansion, it is very unusual to read such a humble 
budgetary demand statement from the military. At the end of 1877, when the 
struggles with China and Korea had been settled and Saigo’s military forces had been 
suppressed, investment and industrial promotion became the issue of utmost priority 
in Japan.71 
 
Table 5. Percentage of Naval Expenditure in Total State Expenditure, 1876-1895 
 
Source: calculated from Ono Giichi. War and Armament Expenditures of Japan. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1922, pp 56. 
 
Things began to change when the Imo incident (????) triggered a security alarm 
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in 1882. The incident was a violent uprising by soldiers and commoners in Seoul 
who were dissatisfied with a series of modernization projects carried out by Emperor 
Gojong. In part, it was also the opposition to the Emperor’s support for Japanese 
military advisors, who were invited to train the Korea army and took up important 
positions. The rioters killed many government officials and occupied the Changdeok 
Palace. They also turned on the members of the Japanese legation in the city, who 
barely escaped with the help of a British ship. The news of uprising immediately led 
to a rising sense of crisis among the Japanese leadership. In December 1882, the 
court noble Iwakura Tomomi, under the request of the Navy Minister Kawamura 
Sumiyoshi, submitted a proposal to Emperor Meiji to advocate for urgent naval 
expansion in preparation for the potential conflict.  
 
Nonetheless, Japan by that time was undergoing an austerity finance to control 
inflation caused by excessive issue of paper notes incurred by the Seinan War. To 
recover the value of paper notes, the government was determined to stop the issuance 
of inconvertible paper notes and keep the state expenditure at a fixed level over three 
years to generate fiscal surplus necessary to redeem paper notes. Initially, the Meiji 
statesmen found the austerity program and request for naval expansion difficult to 
reconcile with each other. Yet, with confidence of the potential in extracting more 
revenues from indirect taxes, the Ministry of Finance launched a plan to raise 7.5 
million yen annually by increasing the taxes on alcohol and tobacco. The tax rate on 
alcohol was raised from 2 yen per koku to 4 yen per koku, and inspection on 
unlicensed brewing was further strengthened to eliminate tax evasion. As the Finance 
Minister Matsukata Masayoshi explained in his policy statement, he was confident 
that that there was still room for higher tax rates as both the total output and retail 
prices of alcohol had increased in 1881 regardless of heavier tax burden. In this way, 
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the first long-term expansion program was able to be implemented through raising 
indirect tax rates without further issuing more inconvertible notes.72 The revenues 
from increasing taxes was to be put in a Bureau of Armaments??????separated 
from ordinary state expenditures. By March 1883, the navy secured the 6.5 million 
yen required annually to support an eight-year expansion program, which was the 
largest the navy had ever secured considering that the previous annual naval budgets 
were just above 3 million yen. The program allowed the navy to acquire thirty-two 
warships, of which two protected cruisers were purchased from Britain. Sporadic 
expansion was now replaced by continuous, planned expansion, and the navy tripled 
in size.  
 
In addition, further expansion of the 1882 program was funded through the issuance 
of long-term state bonds. Two years after the Imo incident, new requests for naval 
expansion emerged due to outbreak of the Gapsin Incident (????). In 1884, the 
Japanese consulate and its guard forces in Seoul, which had been assisting the coup 
d’etat by Kim Ok Kyun, were attacked by Chinese force led by Yuan Shikai and 
routed, being forced to return to Japan. Since this was a serious loss of face for Japan, 
the demands of the Navy and Army for military expansion against China reached a 
new level. Except this, the original plan of naval expansion supported by tax increase 
was not going on smoothly. As the retrenchment policy led to deflation and declined 
purchasing power, the total output of alcohol fell 35 percent in 1883, and revenues 
from indirect taxes dropped from 16.3 million in 1882 to 13.5 million in 1883 in  
spite of the increased tax rate. Therefore, revenues from raising alcohol and tobacco 
taxes turned out below expectation and the Bureau of Armaments went completely 
bankrupted. Consequently, Matsukata was forced to reduce the scale of naval 
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expansion with actual expenditure cut by 13 percent and 22 percent from the original 
plan in 1883 and 1884 respectively.73  
 
To carry on the naval buildup without disrupting the redemption of inconvertible 
paper notes, Matsukata first appealed to issue short-term bonds issued by the 
Ministry of Finance in 1886. With the promulgation of Naval Public Bond 
Instrument Ordinance in June 1886, a total value of 17-million-yen naval bonds were 
issued over three years. The issue conditions were: 5-percent interest bearing, 
redemption for 30 years from the year following a deferment of five years, an offer 
price of 100 percent of face value, and a price-competitive auction. As severe 
deflation made government bonds a safe and attractive option to investors, the 
subscription for the first issue exceeded three times the initial amount of 5 million 
yen. In this way, the navy expenditure used to be funded solely on taxation was now 
greatly increased. With the help of state bonds, enough funds were provided for the 
purchase of an additional twenty-eight torpedo boats, one first-class ironclad, six 
first-class and second-class dispatch boats, eight first-class and second-class 
gunboats, and a number of support vessels, which altogether totaled fifty-four vessels 
with a combined displacement of 66,300 tons. Relationship between retrenchment 
policy and request for naval expansion, which was confrontational at the time of the 
Imo Incident of 1882, now became manageable.74  
 
A structural change in politics brought about the promulgation of the Meiji 
Constitution in 1889, under which a parliamentary cabinet system was introduced. 
Initially, the promulgation of parliament caused difficulty in increasing government 
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revenues and expenditures. In the newly established Diet, representatives from 
opposition parties in the lower house demanded land tax reduction, increased 
expenditure on local welfare and infrastructure, and reduction on military spending. 
Even though Article 67 and 37 in the constitution were designed to protect the 
government, the government could no longer raise tax rate and increase state 
expenditure at its will.75 Despite the declined state autonomy, the already-
established fiscal institutions were still able to provide sufficient resource for 
continuous naval expansion. The raise of indirect taxes went on relatively smoothly 
in comparison with land taxes, of which the increase was difficult due to the 
oppositions from landowners in the lower houses. Between the year 1890 and 1893, 
with the additional 2.2 million yen donated under the request of Emperor Meiji, the 
navy was able to purchase three battleships from Argentina at a cost of just over 9 
million ten and one battleship from Chile at a cost of roughly 3 million yen. 
 
The improved resource mobilization capacity also benefited Japan enormously 
during wartime. The outbreak of the first Sino-Japanese War in 1894 forced upon the 
country a huge expenditure of about 200 million yen, which is roughly 2.5 times the 
average annual budgetary expenditure in the five years preceding the war. In order to 
quickly mobilize resources to finance the war, a new War Loan was raised to the 
amount of 150 million at five percent in 1894, and to this 100 million more were 
added in 1895. The subscription exceeded by the enormous sum of more than 40 
million yen. If the war continues, the Meiji government can still issue another 120 
million yen. Eventually, approximately 60 percent of war expenditures were financed 
by state bonds and temporary borrowing from the Bank of Japan, which was later 
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repaid from the Chinese indemnity.76 The high levels of expenditure that 
accompanied the war were only affordable because Meiji Japan was able to raise vast 
sums of fiscal resources.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4. Qing China 
 
In this chapter, I argue that Qing China’s relative weak naval capability was mainly 
caused by its fiscal decentralization, stagnated taxing capacity and limited borrowing 
capacity. Despite the significant rise in total state revenue after the Taiping Rebellion, 
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Qing China experienced a drastic decline of resource control. The central 
government could neither control local governments’ newly-acquired resources nor 
effectively allocate resources for its policy agenda. However, instead of 
recentralizing resource control through fiscal reforms, the central government 
maintained the status quo and used its political authority to directly transfer fiscal 
burdens to local governments. Yet as the taxing and borrowing capacity could not 
catch up with the state’s growing spending demands, naval buildup experienced 
continuous funding shortages and was thus significantly delayed.  
 
4.1 Historical Background: early naval defense and state finance 
 
The early Qing naval history was characterized by a prolonged ignorance of naval 
defense. In the early days of the Qing dynasty, the government’s warships and crews 
were directly inherited from the Ming dynasty. Defense was mostly constructed 
along the coast of Fujian province to counter against Zheng Chenggong, the last 
official in Ming dynasty who battled with Qing. With the successful capture of 
Taiwan, the need of seaborne defense declined, and the government turned its energy 
to fend off threats to China's northern border. As a result, the Southeast maritime 
frontier was exposed to pirates and the British merchants, who continued to harass 
Guangdong during the Jiaqing and Daoguang periods.77 
 
Public finance had great influence on the maritime defensive strategies the Qing 
officials adopted to counter with pirates in the South China Sea. Instead of 
contrasting a centralized national naval force, the Qing central government delegated 
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the task of naval defense to coastal provinces. Since the construction of provincial 
naval forces were considered as local governments’ expenditures,        
provincial-governors tended not to strengthen their standing naval forces but defend 
the coastline by cutting off the supplements from inland, for it was deemed as a less 
costly yet effective strategy to starve the enemies at sea.78 In this way, Qing China 
was gradually left behind by the European states, which had actively enhanced their 
maritime aggressiveness with advanced machinery and technology. Until the dawn of 
the first Opium War, the Chinese navy remained a police force operating to 
exterminate pirates and illegal trading activities, while being technically incapable of 
sailing off to the high sea. The lack of a regular, professional training scheme for the 
navy also rendered its combat capacity insufficient. Not surprisingly, with fewer than 
5,000 troops and 20 warships, the British were able to win the war and rewrite trade 
laws that were demonstrably unfair to the Chinese.79 
 
While the defeat in the Opium War did not immediately lead to a rise of awareness in 
naval defense, it was the Taiping Rebellion that gave birth to the first batch of 
Chinese steam navy.80 To combat Taiping fleets equipped with western firepower, 
the Qing government began to acquire western ships, cannons, and set up shipping 
building factories in southern China. As many governors-general considered 
domestic construction the most effective way to catch up with the West, shipbuilding 
factories prospered and started to domestically constructed steam warships. The 
Jiangnan Arsenal (?????) was a representative product of that time. Started 
from 1868, eleven ships were built in the Jiangnan Arsenal within eight years, of 
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which ten were provided with wooden and iron hulls. All parts of each ship, 
including the engine, were built at the Arsenal. Another example was the Fuzhou 
Naval Yard (?????), which was established to build a modern Chinese flotilla. 
In total, sixteenth ships were constructed with 80 to 250 horsepower engines. Ten 
transporting ships with 100 horsepower engines, and one corvette as a showpiece 
with a 250-horsepower engine, were realized later during 1869-75.  
 
Overall, however, those domestically-constructed ships still failed to catch up with 
the technological advancement in Europe, especially when the compound engine was 
invented and easily superseded the outmoded single or double screw engines 
installed in Chinese vessels.81 Therefore, in 1874 when Japan’s Taiwan Expedition 
raised a security alarm to the Qing court, officials considered the strategy of direct 
foreign purchase more efficient to acquire a strong navy. In 1875, an imperial edict 
was issued to announce that the state will “mobilize resource from the entire country 
to support naval buildup”. It was later decided to build up two national fleets, the 
Beiyang and Nanyang Fleet, to defend the north and south coasts along with the 
provincial naval forces. Unlike the traditional provincial navies, the buildup of the 
two new fleets were considered as the central government’s responsibility.82 
 
Meanwhile, significant changes also took place in state finance. Previously, Qing 
China was already a tax state that derived majority of its revenue from land taxes.83 
Yet, the tax system was stable but inelastic, especially after land tax being frozen by 
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the Kangxi Emperor. As the tax system could not well adapt to changes, the 
government often resorted to donations from big merchants or selling of official 
ranks to meet urgent spending needs of war and disaster reliefs.84 Therefore, when 
the Taiping Rebellion broke out in the 1850s, the government was totally ill-prepared 
to handle the unprecedent amount of fiscal demands. To make matters worse, the 
Taiping’s control of the lower Yangzi region and war damage to many of the richest 
agricultural areas made more extractions from land tax impossible. Facing with the 
desperate need for revenues, the center permitted local governments to collect a new 
tax, the lijin duties levied on domestic consumption, as an emergent fiscal measure. 
Along with the maritime customs duties centrally collected by a Western 
administration (the Imperial Maritime Customs), the two soon became most 
important revenues that helped Qing China muddle through crises. When the 
Rebellion ended, significant transformations had taken place in both the amount and 
structure of state revenue: Qing China’s annual tax revenue has doubled from about 
40 million tael of silver in the 1840s to some 80 million tael in the 1880s, of which 
the majority came from the lijin duties and maritime customs.85  
 
Despite the significant growth in state revenue, the subsequent resource mobilization 
for naval buildup was far from smooth: while the central government allocated 4 
million tael annually as ordinary naval funds, the amount that the navy received 
never exceeded 3 million tael every year, and the expansion project was even forced 
to stop by the end of the 1880s.86 What was the reason for Qing China’s failure in 
resource mobilization? Classic accounts hold that it was the “regionalism” risen 
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during the Rebellion that seriously weakened the central government’s military as 
well as financial power relative to the provincial-governors.87 To thoroughly 
evaluate this argument, we first need to understand how the Qing fiscal system 
functioned.  
 
4.2 Fiscal Decentralization  
 
Regardless of the significant increase in total state revenue, Qing China’s fiscal 
system remained unchanged. The system looks extremely decentralized from surface. 
On the one hand, the central government did not have its own tax collection 
administrations. Taxes were almost entirely collected by local governments and 
shared upward with the center. On the other hand, Qing China did not have a central 
body of receipt to receive and centrally allocate majority of state revenue. Instead, 
the Central Treasury (????) only received 18 to 28 percent of the total state 
revenue remitted from local governments as jingxiang (??), while the rest were 
stored at local treasuries (??). Even for the customs duties collected by the 
Imperial Maritime Customs, the center received only 40 percent into its own 
coffers.88 
In spite of these decentralized features, the fiscal system was highly centralized in 
view of the strict rules set up by the center. First, local governments did not have 
budgetary autonomy. They were not allowed to set up their own tax rate and 
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spending quota without the center’s permission. Second, that some 70 percent of 
state revenue retained in local treasuries were not to be freely disposed by local 
governments. Instead, they still belonged to the center and were subject to the Board 
of Revenue’s allocation (????). Even though the Board did not directly allocate 
revenues from an aggregated account in central treasury, it was entitled to issue 
assignment orders (??) to local governments, requiring them to transfer these 
reserves to destinations of demands, such as inter-provincial transfers from “rich” to 
“poor” provinces and departments that were categorized as xiexiang (??). Through 
these rules, the Board of Revenue was able to centrally allocate state resources from 
a distance.89  
 
To effectively control state resources, the Board of Revenue needed not only political 
authority but also the effective supervision over local governments’ fiscal affairs. The 
zouxiao (??) system that resembles an annual central auditing system in modern 
sense was created to provide the necessary information for supervision. Specifically, 
under the zouxiao system, local governments were required to submit annual account 
reports of revenues and expenditures to the Board. These reports were then assigned 
to a department of the Board for auditing, and then the expenditures were checked to 
ascertain whether they had been made in accordance with the specific regulations of 
the Board.90 With the information provided in annual account reports, the Board 
could have a solid grasp of local governments’ revenues, expenditures, and reserves 
at local treasuries, which is essential for the Board to make effective assignment 
orders that required it to match specific sources of revenues with items of 
expenditure across the entire country.  
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To ensure the accuracy of these account books, supervisors (???) were 
dispatched from the Board of Revenue to supervise provincial-governors (??) in 
the making of account books and handling local fiscal affairs. Provincial-governors 
could not simply report expenditures at the end of the year. Instead, only after 
approval was given by the Board could an official disburse funds and declare 
expenditure in his annual accounts. Neither could they use the reserves without 
central sanction. If one failed to request permission in advance, one was acting 
contrary to the regulations and could be impeached. As for resource allocation, if a 
province failed to remit the assigned amount of revenues to destinations of demand, 
the Board or the governor of the affected province could memorialize to the emperor, 
and provincial-governors who had continuous failures to remit the required funds 
was grounded to impeachment. Through these rules, the Board of Revenue achieved 
centralized control of state resource even though the operations of resource collection 
and allocation were decentralized. In the central government’s view, this 
arrangement was avoided the formidable transportation of bulky species from 
localities to the center.91  
Then, how could we explain Qing China’s failed resource mobilization for naval 
buildup? Why did the navy fail to receive the assigned amount of ordinary funds 
from local governments? I argue that it was because the dysfunction of the zouxiao 
system has resulted in weakened supervision of the central government over its local 
agents, and thus handicapped the center’s ability to effectively allocate resources that 
were stored in local treasuries and to control the newly-acquired local revenues. The 
decline of zouxiao system was caused by both historical problems in institutional 
design and the disruption of the Taiping Rebellion.  
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Figure 1. Decentralized Resource Allocation of Qing China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First, local officials’ removal of reserves at local treasuries, despite being illegal, had 
started since the early Qing dynasty. Rather than corruption and embezzlement, the 
fundamental cause was Qing China’s rigid quota-based budgetary system failed to 
provide enough funds for local expenses. As stated above, the budgeting of local 
administrations was controlled by the center in pursuit of centralization. However, 
when making provincial budget, the central government adopted a quota-based 
system that almost fixed both the tax collection and spending of provinces. In 
practice, this system seriously underestimated the costs of maintaining local 
administrations, and thus failed to accommodate the actual spending needs of 
provinces. Nothing was provided for the local authority confronted with pressing 
shortages in the course of day-to-day administration, making fiscal shortage part of 
the life of every provincial official in Qing China.  
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To make it worse, while local expenses increased as a result of the doubled 
population in the eighteenth century, the statutory quotas remained almost 
unchanged. To what extent were the statutory quota of expenses insufficient to meet 
the actual expenditure needs of local government? According to an estimation of two 
prefectures in late 1880s, the funds formally made available for local administration 
accounted for less than one sixth of the actual outlay in one case and less than one 
tenth in another.92 Under such circumstance, it is not surprising that local officials 
were often forced to resort to “informal financing” to cover administrative costs. 
Except from seeking more revenues from land tax surcharges and extra fees, one of 
the methods they often used was temporary removal of reserves stored in local 
treasuries to balance deficits.93 While some may be made up later, some would 
never fill the vacancy until being found out. Gradually, the accumulated deficits in 
treasuries made the number appeared in account books lost in touch with reality. 
 
Meanwhile, studies suggest that the institutions aiming to prevent officials’ 
misappropriations failed to curb the problem. To prevent officials from removing the 
reserve funds, the central government made various monitoring policies, of which the 
most important were the annual audit, regular audit in official term rotation, and 
extraordinary nationwide audit.94 The regular audit in officials’ term rotation was 
supposed to be an effective way to monitor the officials. As the Qing court regulated, 
“if the successor discovered silver deficits, he should report to the upper level 
officials and related department and impeach his predecessor.” However, it turned 
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out that the audit in term rotation was rather useless. In the actual practice, even if 
the successors discovered the deficits, his superior was also inclined to hide the facts, 
as the problems of removing and refilling reserved funds were so widespread that 
strict enforcement of rules became impractical. Consequently, monitoring policies 
largely failed to discover the treasury deficits.95 
 
Despite that this problem has been long existed, for most part the fiscal system 
seemed to have functioned reasonably well when state expenditure was kept at a low 
level. However, Taiping Rebellion occurred and broke the prolonged fiscal balance. 
During the one and a half decades from 1850 to 1864, the normal running of zouxiao 
system was severely disrupted. On the one hand, reserves at local treasuries were 
frequently removed to meet urgent spending needs of military campaigns without 
informing the Board of Revenue in advance. As removals were so frequent, it 
became impossible for the Board to keep track with each flow and be updated with 
the latest fiscal situation in localities. On the other hand, as the center now gave local 
governments the autonomy to mobilize resources to cover military expenses (???
?), the newly-acquired lijin duties, as well as large sum of urgent extraordinary 
expenditures were not included in the account books sent to the Board.96 Lastly, the 
remittance of assignment orders, including both jingxiang and xiexiang, became 
severely disrupted and frequently delayed.  
 
When the rebellion ended, the central government sought to reverse the trend of 
decentralization by launching nationwide programs to restore the normal running of 
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the zouxiao system and to overhaul the messy wartime finance. Starting from 
November 1875, the central government first restored the normal running of the 
zouxiao system. In addition, it ordered provincial-governors to include lijin duties in 
their submitted account books, regularly report the amounts collected, the number 
and location of each lijin collection station, and the names of collecting officials. By 
1874, most local governments sent the required accounts to the Board of Revenue, 
twice a year from provinces in the economic core areas and once a year from those in 
remote areas. In this way, lijin revenue was formally incorporated in the zouxiao 
system as state revenue just like land taxes and thus were also subject to the Board’s 
allocation. Second, the center also ordered provincial-governors to overhaul the 
messy accounts accumulated during the Rebellion and conducted surveys of deficits 
at local treasuries. In the year after, the Boards once again reminded      
provincial-governors to overhaul the deficits at sub-provincial treasuries.  
 
Nonetheless, the recentralizing outcome was relatively disappointing. First, as the 
amount of lijin revenues was subject to the self-reports of provincial-governors, they 
were likely to prevent the Board from having access to the real income. Second, in 
regard of the Board of Revenue’s repeated orders of overhauling deficits, until 1882 
there were only few responses except from Jiangxi province, where governor Zhang 
Zhidong carried out corresponding reform. Even though provincial-governors 
claimed that they had conducted due surveys, the offending officials they reported 
were either passed away or already impeached, and the amount of misappropriations 
retrievable were little. For instance, although the Guangdong Treasury Manager 
Gang Yi submitted 785 misappropriation cases, only 2,100 tael could be retrieved 
because most of the officials involved were no longer in office. In general, local 
governments, though could not ignore the center’s order, responded to 
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recentralization halfheartedly.97  
 
An evident consequence of these changes was the declined effectiveness of the Board 
of Revenue’s resource allocation. Since the disruption of wartime auditing and failed 
recentralization made information in account books losing in touch with reality to an 
unprecedent degree, the Board’s nationwide resource allocation that relied on 
accurate information of local finances became less effective. Frequently, the Board of 
Revenue made assignment orders out of inadequate or no reserves. For instance, in 
the case of Jiangsu naval funds, when in 1884 the Board of Revenue assigned 
180,000 tael of salt taxes from the Lianghuai Salt Commission owed to the center as 
fund for naval defense in Jiangsu, the Jiangsu government eventually found out that 
there was no real revenue under this item. In summary, the decentralized resource 
allocation was extremely difficult to effectively operate when spending demands 
reached a new level during the post-Rebellion period.98  
4.3 Stagnated tax revenue  
 
Rather than recentralize resource control through enhancing supervision or 
fundamentally reforming the decentralized fiscal operation, the central government 
maintained the status quo while adopted a make-up strategy of “forced assignment” 
(????).99 Unlike normal assignment orders that were made according to local 
fiscal situations, the “forced assignment” was the central government using its 
despotic power to force local governments to take up its fiscal burdens. Since the 
central government still possessed unquestioned political authority over local 
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officials, they could not ignore these fiscal obligations imposed on them, as 
otherwise their official careers would be at risk. Through the forced assignments, the 
central government amazingly squeezed a large sum of revenues from local 
governments to support various national projects, such as the Reconquest of Xinjiang 
and the Sino-French War. The amount of resource mobilized through forced 
assignments accumulated to 13.76 million tael before 1894.100 
 
From the side of the local governments who took up the center’s fiscal burden, they 
were under great pressure to mobilize revenues to meet the center’s forced 
assignment orders. It has been suggested that those assignment orders probably 
caused huge fiscal burdens to local governments and exhausted their coffers. Taking 
Sichuan province as an example, among the 10.3 million tael of provincial annual 
revenue, over 80 percent were spent for demands outside the province itself in the 
form of both jingxiang and xiexiang.101 In the case of Jiangsu province, the  
Jiangsu-Zhejiang governor Zuo Zongtang in 1883 requested the Board of Revenue to 
cut down Jiangsu’s assignment orders when the flood had caused a significant 
reduction of lijin revenues. While local expenditures increased for disaster relief, the 
burden of meeting various assignment orders remained unchanged, which included 
regular jingxiang, construction projects of the Yellow River, military training fees for 
the Eight Banners and for local armies in Guizhou, Gansu, and Northeast provinces. 
Nonetheless, after praising Jiangsu for remitting revenues punctually in the past two 
years, the Board of Revenue rejected Zuo’s proposal but stressed the importance of  
the assignment orders, and ordered Zuo to “try his best (???????????).” 
In the most extreme cases, the governors and the offices of the Imperial Maritime 
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Customs in Guangdong and Fujian provinces even had to borrow short-term credits 
from domestic banks to meet the Board’s assignment orders. Jiangsu and Hubei 
provinces had to cast copper coins amounting to 1.4 million of tael as “there was no 
other way to meet the orders.”102 Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that most of the 
provincial revenues were spent not for their own needs.  
 
Although local governments vigorously sought for revenues to meet the massive 
assignment orders from the center, the two decades after the Taiping Rebellion did 
not see great improvement in Qing China’s taxing capacity. First, the traditional 
pillar-land taxes, remained unchanged for centuries. The stagnation was based on 
two concerns: First, in the early years of the dynasty there were many instances of 
officials conducting local land survey and resorting to various kinds of abuses, such 
as demanding onerous fees from the land-owners, and popular opposition to this 
undertaking was aroused. Hence emperors and high-ranking officials deemed it not 
only financially unnecessary but also politically undesirable to embark on a cadastral 
survey.103 Second, after the Taiping Rebellion the government was beset with 
increasing financial difficulties and therefore did not have the wherewithal to 
undertake a nationwide land survey even though scholars like Feng Guifen strongly 
advocated it.104 The result was that Qing China’s land tax revenue per capital fell far 
behind that of Meiji Japan and remained statutory after the 1850s.  
 
Neither was increasing revenues from custom duties an available option. From late 
1860s on, Western officials began to centrally manage the Imperial Maritime 
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Customs and reliably collected customs for the Qing government. But just like Meiji 
Japan, the tariff rate of Qing China was fixed by the Western powers at 5 percent, 
and therefore customs receipts could only grow with the increasing volume of trade 
in commodities. Although the total revenues of custom duties increased four times 
from 4.9 million taels in 1861 to 20.5 million in 1887 due to growing foreign trade, 
the Qing government could not derive more revenues from customs duties by raising 
tariff rates.105  
 
In terms of revenues from lijin duties, it became the major source of revenue for 
Qing China since the Taiping Rebellion. Initially started as an exigent fiscal measure 
in 1853, lijin duties was a kind of indirect taxes levied on domestic commercial 
goods in transition. After the collection of lijin duties became formalized during the 
post-war period, local governments in economic core areas raised the tax rate far 
beyond the modest 1 percent initially envisaged. As for regional variations, together 
the four southeastern provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong 
provided more than 50 percent of the total lijin revenues, while the prosperous 
middle Yangzi region of Jiangxi, Hubei, and Hunan each contributed more than one  
million tael annually. There existed a large varieties of target goods, such as rice, silk, 
cotton, lumber, tea, and domestic opium that sustained high levels of returns. They 
were divided into 25 separate categories. The lijin duties levied on the sale of salt and 
imported opium augmented state revenues after the mid-1860s. By the late 1860s, 
nominal revenue from lijin duties averaged 15 million tael per year.106 
But as Table 6 shows, it was calculated that after a sudden rise during the Taiping 
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Rebellion, lijin revenue remained stable for the two decades before 1895. Among 
various reasons of its stagnation, the decentralized collection and management of 
lijin duties were likely to be the most important. First, instead of being centrally 
collected at the place of production as the alcohol tax in Japan, majority of lijin 
duties was levied on goods in transition. Therefore, local governments had to set up 
many collecting stations in transportation spots to prevent tax evasion, and 
consequently resulted in high administrative costs that could not be easily reduced. 
Second, as the central government did not impose a uniform tax rate but let local 
governments decide according to their circumstances, many provinces, motivated by 
the task of meeting the center’s assignment orders, tried to maximize their lijin 
revenues by lowering down the tax rate to attract businessmen from neighboring 
provinces to choose their transportation roads. This has led to a vicious competition 
among provinces which competed for taxpayers by cutting down tax rates. 
Eventually, it became hard for everyone to further increase revenues by raising tax 
rate.107 
 
Table 6. Average Annual Lijin Revenue, 1861-1911 
 
Year/period Average Annual Lijin Revenue  
1861-1875 15+ million tael 
1875-1895 14 million tael 
1908 20 million tael 
 
Source: ???????????????????????2010???? 82?185? 
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The uniform tax rate experimented in Jiangsu province in 1890 was the last attempt 
of Qing China to improve lijin revenues before the war. As proposed by governor Liu 
Bingzhang, converting the various transit lijin levied on domestic opium by stations 
scattered in various regions into one uniform rate levied on big salers in producing 
provinces would facilitate the centralized management of lijin collection and extract 
more revenues.108 However, it was not until the early 1900 did this reform become 
widely adopted. In 1903, the uniformed tax rate on domestic opium was first 
launched in Hunan and Hubei province. In his letter to Jiangxi governor, Hunan 
governor Duan Fang highly praised it as a mean to “increase revenue without 
expanding the basis, enrich the country without harming the people”. The reform 
result was beyond expectation. From January 1904 to 1905, incomes from lijin levied 
on domestic opium reached about 1.3 million tael, which was three times the amount 
before the reform. The same reform was also proven effective in Guangdong and 
Guangxi provinces.109 However, before the First Sino-Japanese War, no nationwide 
reforms were implemented and revenue from lijin duties remained relatively 
stagnated. 
 
4.4 Limited Borrowing Capacity  
 
The lack of borrowing capacity, especially at domestic market, has severely inhibited 
Qing China’s ability to rapidly mobilize resources for urgent demands. Since July 
1894, the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War soon caused pressing fiscal 
demands. The 5 million tael reserves at the central treasury was quickly exhausted 
within one month. Other resource mobilization strategies, such as cutting ordinary 
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expenditures and increasing lijin duties levied on tea and sugar, failed to generate 
immediate revenues. Under such circumstances, borrowing, especially domestic 
borrowing became growingly attractive to the center.110  
 
Starting from September 1894, the Board of Revenue launched a voluntary state 
bond targeting at wealthy merchants in Beijing (????). Unlike previous 
merchant donations of which the money did not need to be repaid, the state bond was 
the very first attempt of the central government to borrow directly from the people 
with repaid interest and principal. The value of this bond was set as 100 million tael, 
bearing an annual interest rate of 7 percent, and the term was three years. Creditors 
also received official titles as complements for their contributions. Later on, the 
Board of Revenue orders provincial-governors to use the same method to mobilize 
resources from localities.  
 
Nonetheless, the result was relatively unsuccessful as the subscription amount was 
only 6 million tael out of the center’s initial 20 million target. The failure of floating 
domestic bonds was largely due to local governments’ poor creditworthiness. Instead 
of centrally managing the subscription and interest payments of the state bonds or 
relying on private financial institutions to issue paper notes, the Board of Revenue 
distributed these bonds to provincial governments, which were then responsible for 
the interest payments on the bonds issued each province. In this way, the center in 
fact passed the burden of interest payments onto governors but did not have any 
effective means to discipline them to pay creditors on time.  
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Evidences suggest that delays and nonpayment of interest were prevalent. Since the 
central government did not set up specific regulations of how these bonds should be 
termed and administrated at localities, the varied designs and corresponding success 
bonds in different regions clearly revealed the importance of creditworthiness in 
successful borrowing. For example, Guangdong governor Li Hanzhang, who well 
understood the importance of securing confidence in the initial stage of domestic 
borrowing, adopted an innovative strategy to entrust bond management to the local 
Imperial Maritime Customs. In this way, the Customs served as an intermediary 
between the creditors (local merchants) and the borrower (Guangdong government) 
and helped ensure the credibility of bonds. More importantly, since interest payments 
of the bonds were secured by customs revenues directly collected by the Guangdong 
Customs, they could be directly paid to creditors from the Custom Office without 
going through the Guangdong government, which may use revenues for other 
purposes. These strategies enhanced the creditworthiness of Guangdong government 
and made the bonds more attractive.111 By contrast, bonds directly managed by local 
governments were less secured and welcomed. For example, Jiangsu governor Zhang 
Zhidong diverted the 0.6 million tael of lijin revenues away from paying the matured 
local bonds for preparing the initial capitals for the Suzhou Rayon Factory and Silk  
Factory, leading to massive complaints from merchants holding the bonds. The 
delays and even nonpayment of interests severely damaged local governments 
creditworthiness and added difficulties for Qing China’s subsequent borrowing.112  
 
The disappointing performance of domestic bonds forced the central government to 
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turn to foreign markets. In total, the central government borrowed 13 million pounds 
from British and Germany banks, which raised loans on behalf of the Chinese state in 
the international markets. Foreign borrowing constituted 5 percent of the total war 
mobilization of Qing government. However, the borrowing capacity of the Qing 
government was still very limited in comparison with the Meiji government, which 
was able to mobilize almost three times (22.367 million yen, or roughly 16 million 
tael) the amount of Qing China solely from domestic market.113 
 
4.5 Impacts on Naval Buildup  
 
The weak resource mobilization capacity of Qing China has seriously constrained its 
ability to pursue naval power and respond to external threats. With weakened control 
of state resource since the mid nineteenth century, the Qing government had to use its 
despotic power to force local governments to compel with its assigned spending 
orders. However, this method was less effective in the case of naval funds, which 
belonged to ordinary state expenditure and was thus deemed as less important than 
other more urgent assignment orders by provincial-governors. Consequently, naval 
buildup in Qing China always struggled with achieving the original targets it set. The 
funding shortages largely determined the Qing China’s passive response to foreign 
threats and sporadic way of expansion. Eventually, the stagnation of naval buildup 
since 1891 led to a relative decline of Qing China’s naval capability and was proved 
fatal in the forthcoming war.  
 
The weakness of fiscal decentralization was clearly exposed in the Board of 
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Revenue’s resource allocation for naval buildup. Under Qing China’s decentralized 
fiscal system, naval funds were to be remitted from provinces and customs under the 
Board’s order. In 1875, the Board of Revenue allocated an annual fund of 4 million 
tael out of the lijin revenues from Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Jiangxi and Hubei and customs 
from Shanghai, Ningbo, Fuzhou, and Guangzhou as the navy’s ordinary maintenance 
fees. However, as shown in Table 7, the navy only received 30 percent of the 
assigned amount of lijin revenues from the four provinces. The customs, while 
slightly better than the lijin revenues, also suffered from delays and arrears. The main 
reason was that the naval fund, as a kind of ordinary state expenditure, was not 
considered a priority by provincial-governors who struggled to meet other more 
urgent assignment orders more likely to threaten their official career. As explained by 
Zhili governor Zhang Shusheng, provincial-governors often tried their best to meet 
the assigned quota of jingxiang and urgent orders to avoid the severe punishments  
caused by delayed remittance (??????????????????????
??????????????). Therefore, the remittance of jingxiang was 
relatively satisfactory with just 6 percent rate of arrears, whereas the ordinary 
assignment orders such as naval funds and inter-provincial assistances suffered from 
frequent delays, reductions and arrears. One governor even claimed explicitly in the 
memorial that he would only assist other provinces when there was fiscal surplus (?
??????????????????????????????????
??????????????).114 The success in funding urgent spending 
expenditures was in sharp contrast with the failure at meeting regular assignment 
orders. 
 
Table 7. The Arrears of Ordinary Naval Funds, Qing China, 1875-1894  
                                                      
114 ????<????????????????????>?? 19? 
 75 
Unit: million tael 
Province Assigned amount (a) Received amount (b) a/b 
Jiangxi 2.15 1.10 50.57% 
Zhejiang 3.10 1.24 42.7% 
Jiangsu 3.10 0.36 12.4% 
Hubei 2.175 1.66 76.3% 
Total 14.5 4.36 30% 
 
Source: calculated from??????????????????????????
1984???? 526? 
 
Having been clearly aware of provincial-governors’ priority, Beiyang governor Li 
Hongzhang tried to use the central government’s political authority to discipline the 
offending governors. When Japan’s occupation of R????? in 1879 rose a security 
alarm within the Qing court, Li took the chance to report the massive delays and 
arrears of naval funds to the Empress Dowager. According to Li, the actual amount 
of ordinary naval funds received by the Beiyang Fleet was not even half of the 
assigned 2 million tael. He further requested the Emperor Dowager to issue an 
imperial decree to urge governors to quickly send the assigned amount of revenues, 
otherwise the Beiyang Fleet would be at risk as it had no funds to purchase necessary 
equipment like gunboats, armored cruisers and ironclads. Again, in the next year, Li 
proposed to incorporate the naval funds as a part of jingxiang, through which could 
help ensure more punctual remittance of revenues.115 However, the central 
government by that time rarely adopt severe punishments to discipline governors to 
abide by the regular assignment orders. Among various regular assignment orders, 
only the interprovincial transfer for Shaanxi-Gansu and Yunnan provinces were 
temporarily resolved through punishing offending officials.116 One deep reason was 
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that the Board of Revenue was unable to trace over time the sources of revenues that 
the governors had removed to meet urgent assignment orders. Hence it could not tell 
deliberate neglect from true inability to meet the regular assignment orders in 
provinces. 
 
To make matters worse, the pre-assigned naval funds also suffered from removals for 
other state projects that were deemed as more urgent. For example, the infamous 
extravagance of the Empress Dowager was met by removing money from the regular 
naval funds and sent it to the Imperial Household. Although these removals were 
usually temporary, they still delayed the naval buildup as the repayment often took a 
long time. In consequence, among the assigned 4 million tael annual naval funds, the 
actual amount the navy received never exceeded 3 million tael. Disappointed with 
ordinary naval funds, Li Hongzhang frequently resorted to whatever resources 
available to pool sufficient funds. For example, the purchase of the       
Germany-constructed armored cruiser Ji Yuan (??) in 1879 was completed by 
appropriating 0.44 million tael from the training fees for Huai Army under Li’s 
management. Other sources of revenue include donations from salt merchants at 
Lianghuai area, residual revenue from the China Merchants Steam Navigation 
Company, spare cashes from military training fees of the Eight Banners, and even 
funds for foreign missions from the Zongli Yamen. Despite the varieties, they were 
mostly one-time assistances that could not solve the fundamental problem. 
 
The prolonged funding shortage eventually caused the suspension of naval expansion 
since 1891. In the 1888 Charter of the Beiyang Fleet drafted by the Minster of Zongli 
Yamen Prince Chun and Li Hongzhang, they stressed that the Beiyang Fleet was not 
yet a real naval force according to the standard of European naval powers. The 
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battleships were insufficient in number, with only one transporting ship and no 
survey ship. And they further proposed an 18-warship expansion program that would 
add more armored and protected cruisers and equip the fleet with latest 
armaments.117 Nonetheless, they conceded in the end that the expansion plan should 
“wait for ample funds” and that “they fully understand the current fiscal difficulty of 
the state.” In April 1891, the Board memorialized to the Empress Dowager to 
suspend naval expansion for two years because of the relatively “harmonious” 
foreign relations, and Li conceded. In 1893 when an extraordinary expenditure of 1.5 
million tael occurred due to the need of repairing boilers in warships, Li Hongzhang 
suggested this demand to be postponed and the repairment to be gradually completed 
within a decade. In the end, except for an armored cruiser Ping Yuan (??) 
constructed at Fuzhou Naval Yard, the Beiyang Fleet did not expand until the 
outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War.118  
 
The stagnated expansion had disastrous impacts on Beiyang Fleet’s relative 
capabilities, which faded rapidly with the advent of more advanced naval technology. 
First, the average age of the major warships now reached seven to thirteen years. 
Second, since all the warships were completed before late 1880s, and none were 
updated with the modern medium-calibre quick firing (QF) gun. Even though Li 
Hongzhang realized the importance of armaments and made moves to re-equip the 
vessels, owing to the depredations of naval funds all that could be purchased were 
just a number of Gruson 4 pdrs, which were hardly significant. Last, for the size of 
the cruisers, although all had been fine in their time, none were over 3,000 tons 
displacement, which was small by the standards of the 1890s. Contrary to the 
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suspension in China, Meiji Japan took this chance to actively pursue naval 
capabilities. The newly-acquired warships in the Imperial Japanese Navy all mounted 
either 6in or 4.7in QF guns. Two additions had been made after the Matsushima-class 
with their “battleship-killing” 12.6in Canets-Akitsushima, mounting 6in QF guns, 
and Yoshino, 4,150 tons, the latest 6in-gun protected cruiser from Armstrong 
Shipyard’s which had made 23 knots on trials.119 The limited resource mobilization 
capacity of Qing China was eventually reflected in naval power.  
 
 
 
Chapter 5. Conclusion 
 
To explain the historical puzzle of why the traditionally more powerful Qing China 
lagged behind Meiji Japan in naval buildup, I compared Meiji Japan and Qing 
China’s efforts to build a modern navy to demonstrate that state’s resource 
mobilization capacity, which consists of taxing capacity, fiscal centralization and 
borrowing capacity, was the key independent variable that influenced the two 
countries’ divergent naval buildup success. In Meiji Japan, the state improved the 
efficiency of land and indirect tax collection, centralized the control of state 
resources, and was able to issue long-term state bonds secured by regular tax 
revenues at domestic market. The extraordinary resource mobilization capacity of 
Meiji Japan played a key role in supporting its continuous naval expansion and 
urgent wartime demands. In contrast, Qing China did not significantly enhance its 
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resource mobilization capacity throughout the two decades. Instead, the central 
government’s control of state resources was seriously weakened due to fiscal 
decentralization after the Taiping Rebellion. With stagnated tax revenue and inability 
to borrow domestically, Qing China failed to sustain the naval buildup to defend 
itself against aggressions from the West and Japan. The comparison further proves 
that conventional indicators such as the size of territory, population and economy, are 
not good enough to measure whether a state can effectively mobilize a vast sum of 
resources, especially within a relatively short period of time. 
  
State’s resource mobilization capacity is critical to the fulfillment of various 
government responsibilities and the implementation of all sorts of intended policy 
goals. Conversely, without adequate command over resources, the central  
government would be compelled to recede its role in the provision of essential public 
goods, such as defense against external security and the maintenance of internal order. 
After the victory over China in 1895, Japan continued to increase its allocation for 
naval buildup to around 25 percent of total state revenue.120 The enormous resource 
mobilization capacity enabled the country to fight wars successfully against another 
great power, Russia, in 1904. In addition, the increased resource mobilization 
capacity also allowed the once pigeonholed national goal of “wealthy nation” to  
come back as policy agenda. While Meiji Japan’s early industrialization attempts in 
the 1870s failed primarily because of fiscal shortages, subsequent industrial policies 
went on more smoothly with higher state capacity to devote resources to certain 
industries.121 On the contrary, the declining capacity of Qing China threatened the 
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very survival of the Empire. With loosened grip on resource, the Great Qing Empire 
struggled to maintain its internal order and collapsed within a short time.122 
 
By extending the discussion of “fiscal-military state” to the East Asian context, this 
research confirms that fiscal strength is the “sinews” of state power. Yet, it challenges 
the causal relationship between intra-state military competitions and state’s  
capacity-building as implied by case studies of Europe. Unlike the       
eighteenth-century European states that waged wars in an international context, the 
rise of the Japanese fiscal-military state has interestingly shown that even without 
major international warfare, state could still actively build up its capacity due to 
domestic crisis. In contrast, Qing China did not engage in active state building even 
though it had been involved in several external warfare before 1894. In this case, the 
“external warfare” is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition of state-building. 
What matters fundamentally is whether crises, whether domestic or international 
ones, would result in a severe fiscal crisis that could not be handled by the state’s 
existing institutions, thus generating strong incentives to break down the old system. 
 
This study also challenges the realist theory of foreign/defense policy and 
complements the current neoclassical realist theories. The balance of power theory of 
Kenneth Waltz, which argues that the anarchical international system provides 
incentives for states to adopt similar adaptive strategies, fails to explain why Meiji 
Japan and Qing China responded differently when facing similarly threatening 
international environments.123 Although neoclassical realism recognizes the 
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shortcomings of the parsimonious realist theory and incorporates unit-level variables 
into the analytic frameworks, it has not yet come up with a comprehensive set of 
domestic variables that are key to explain states’ varied balancing behaviors. The 
findings of this research suggest that the central-local fiscal relationships should be 
included in the variable list. Since it is usually the central government that takes 
overall charge of national defense, the military budget is positively correlated with 
the extent of fiscal centralization and negatively correlated with the level of 
decentralization. Therefore, the nuanced power distribution within the vertical state 
structure has to be examined if we are to develop a more comprehensive theory of 
foreign and defense policy.  
 
The findings of this research could also shed some lights on China’s contemporary 
under-balancing tendency. As a state with vast territory, China has always been 
bothered by fiscal decentralization from pre-modern to contemporary times. Over the 
century following the First Sino-Japanese War, the constantly evolving central-local 
fiscal relations and corresponding changes in the central government’s resource 
mobilization capacity have significantly affected the state’s military buildup. In 1988, 
to mitigate fiscal decline, China launched a “fiscal contracting” reform that allowed 
local governments more autonomy over tax collection and budgeting. As a result, 
while local expenditures grew fast, the ratio of central government revenue to state 
total revenue dropped sharply from 40.51 percent in 1984 to 22.02 percent in 
1993.
124
 Consequently, the center’s investment on the military declined, and the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was encouraged to achieve self-sufficiency by 
profiting from military-enterprises, which expanded to various industries such as 
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farming and food production, mining, transport, energy, equipment maintenance and 
repair.
125
 Later in 1994, the central-local fiscal relations were again reversed towards 
recentralization through a tax-sharing reform, and the central share of total state 
revenue successfully rose to around 50 percent.
126
 The center’s advantageous 
position in state revenue distribution soon benefited the military. The PLA’s 
self-sufficient budget was replaced with stable centrally allocated sources, and total 
military spending immediately increased by 5.2 percent in 1994.
127
 However, in 
recent years, the central government once again considered readjusting fiscal 
relations with local governments due to the deteriorating fiscal situation of local 
governments. Although policy details remain unclear, it is likely that the center might 
extract less and increase the share of local governments’ fiscal sufficiency, which 
would unavoidably constrain its own capacity.
128
 These subtle changes in the 
domestic intergovernmental fiscal relations may give some clues of why China has 
been unable to pursue effective counter-balancing against powerful United States. 
For example, while the US typically spends 4% of its GDP on national defense, 
China’s defense spending constitutes merely 1.5% of its GDP. 
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